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1 
WHAT’S IN A NAME?  HOW NATIONS DEFINE TERRORISM 
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 
SUDHA SETTY* 
ABSTRACT 
Ten years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, it almost goes 
without saying that the acts of grotesque violence committed on 
that day have had enormous effects on national security law and 
policy worldwide.  To be labeled a terrorist, or to be accused of 
involvement in an act of terrorism, carries far more severe 
repercussions now than it did ten years ago.  This is true under 
international law and under domestic law in nations that have 
dealt with serious national security concerns for many years. 
Given the U.N.’s global mandate to combat terrorism and that 
being defined as a terrorist can have widespread legal implications, 
this Article seeks to address how legal definitions are shaped and 
analyzes the lack of a globally accepted definition of terrorism in 
the context of domestic counterterrorism obligations.  This Article 
addresses a significant historical gap in examining the interplay 
between international obligations and domestic definitions, the 
previously overlooked history and evolution of those definitions, 
and the potential rule of law issues arising from the definitions in 
their current form. 
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In examining counterterrorism law in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and India, it is clear that definitions of terrorism 
under various domestic laws have been repurposed from one 
legislative context to another and broadened in application, 
particularly since September 11.  This has led to the arguably 
unintended consequences of disparate impact on outsider groups 
and the unmooring from rule of law principles.  Since neither 
international norms nor domestic courts provide a significant 
check against creeping definitions, legislatures must take proactive 
steps to combat potential overreaching in applying the label of 
terrorism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As we reflect on the ten-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, it is clear that the last decade witnessed a 
transformation of the landscape of national security law and 
policy, both domestically and internationally.  Soon after the 
September 11 attacks, the United Nations Security Council took a 
bold, novel step in mandating worldwide domestic lawmaking to 
combat terrorism,1 despite the seemingly central problem that the 
United Nations has not adopted a comprehensive definition of 
terrorism.2 
In the United States and other nations, being labeled a terrorist 
carries different consequences—ranging from trial in a specialized 
court3 to a delay in or denial of access to counsel and other pretrial 
constitutional protections,4 restrictions on freedom of expression,5 
 
1 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. 
Res. 1373] (mandating that all U.N. member nations take proactive steps to 
combat terrorism, including increasing criminalization and implementing harsher 
sentencing for terrorist acts, freezing funds of those financing terrorist acts, 
sharing intelligence information with other member nations, and tightening 
border controls to prevent the migration of terrorists).  See generally Kim Lane 
Scheppele, Other People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11, 50 LOY. L. 
REV. 89, 91–92 (2004) (detailing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 which 
mandated that countries institute laws combating terrorism and noting the lack of 
consensus on the scope of the definition of terrorism). 
2 See S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (attempting to 
more clearly set forth the parameters of terrorism in light of the lack of a 
comprehensive United Nations definition). 
3 See generally Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for 
Terrorism, 63 ME. L. REV. 131 (2010) (detailing the uses and limitations of 
specialized trials for terrorism, as well as comparative perspectives from the 
United Kingdom, Israel, and India). 
4 For example, in May 2010, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder suggested 
that Congress consider legislation to expand and define the public safety 
exception articulated in N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).  Quarles held that the 
obligation of law enforcement officers to inform arrestees of their right to counsel, 
among other Miranda rights, was subject to a public safety exception under 
certain circumstances.  Holder’s proposed legislation would provide for a “broad 
new exception to the Miranda rights” which would permit “investigators to 
interrogate terrorism suspects without informing them of their rights.”  Charlie 
Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at 
A1. 
5 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) 
(holding constitutional under the First Amendment a Patriot Act provision which 
made it unlawful to provide material support and assistance to organizations 
deemed terrorists, even where such support was nonviolent). 
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or weakened constitutional protections of privacy rights in the 
home.6  In countries facing serious national security threats, the 
label of terrorism can have a deep and meaningful effect on those 
deemed to be “terrorists” and on counterterrorism law and policy 
as a whole. 
Given the U.N.’s global mandate to combat terrorism and that 
defining an individual as a terrorist has widespread legal 
implications, this Article seeks to address numerous questions.  
How do definitions of terrorism differ among nations dealing with 
serious national security threats?  How are these legal definitions 
shaped and how does the labeling of a person or entity as a 
terrorist affect them differently than if they were treated as an 
“ordinary” criminal suspect?  What is the impact of the lack of a 
globally accepted definition of terrorism at the U.N. level 
combined with worldwide mandates that are predicated on a 
working definition of terrorism? 
Countries facing serious national security threats face the same 
threshold questions of how to define terrorism and the 
implications of those definitions.  After the adoption of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,7 even countries that 
generally treated acts of terrorism as ordinary criminal matters8 
were moved to define terrorism, if only to comply with Resolution 
1373’s mandate that countries provide details of their 
 
6 See, e.g., discussion infra Section 3.2.2 (discussing control orders in the 
United Kingdom, which restrict suspected terrorist’s movements to and from the 
home). 
7 See S.C. Res 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 3 (calling upon states to cooperate with one 
another to suppress terrorist acts). 
8 See e.g., Nicholas Kulish, Suspects Plan Guilty Pleas in Terror Case in Germany, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10 
/world/europe/10germany.html?src=twt&twt=nytimes (reporting that four 
suspects, accused of membership in terrorist organizations and of plotting 
bombings in Germany, planned to plead guilty to terrorism charges); 14 Terror 
Suspects to Go Straight to Trial, CTV NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007, 
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20070924/terror_trial_070924 (reporting 
on the upcoming trial of fourteen “terror suspects accused of plotting to storm 
Parliament and behead Prime Minister Stephen Harper”); Turkey: Life in Prison for 
6 Al-Qaida Suspects, SEATTLE TIMES, June 10, 2009, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009321775_apeuturkeyal
qaidatrial.html (reporting that a Turkey appellate court upheld life sentences of 
six “al-Qaida militants” and lesser sentences of 33 for their 2003 involvement in 
fatal bombings of synagogues, a bank, and a British consular office). 
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counterterrorism programs.9  Nations facing serious national 
security issues, including the United States, United Kingdom, and 
India, increased the robustness of their counterterrorism efforts in 
the wake of Resolution 1373.10  These nations faced mixed results in 
terms of efficacy, preservation of rights, benefits to national 
security, adherence to the rule of law, and public confidence in 
institutional legitimacy. 
The United Kingdom and India, nations with different 
structural systems and histories of dealing with internal and 
external violence than the United States, are nonetheless 
particularly useful comparators in this analysis.  All three nations 
share a legal heritage and the burden of serious national security 
threats.  Beyond that, however, these nations enjoy relatively 
strong and stable governance structures, a separation of powers 
and political process that has supported challenges to security-
related decision-making, and a relatively high level of 
transparency with regard to the operation of legal mechanisms.  As 
such, the experiences of the United Kingdom and India offer useful 
insight as to how legal definitions of terrorism have undergone 
remarkably similar evolutions despite different historical contexts, 
thereby making this comparative analysis all the more relevant for 
consideration of potential domestic reforms.11 
 
9 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (calling upon states to disclose the 
steps they have taken to implement Resolution 1373).  
10 It is widely understood that the adoption of Resolution 1373 was largely 
due to U.S. pressure on the members of the United Nations Security Council.  See 
Kim Lane Scheppele, The Constitutional Role of Transnational Courts: Principled Legal 
Ideas in Three-Dimensional Political Space, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 451, 455 (2010) 
(“It is no coincidence that UN Security Council Resolution 1373, passed on 28 
September 2001, mirrors almost exactly the strategy for fighting terrorism that one 
sees in the USA PATRIOT Act, which the US was drafting at the same time as it 
was urging the Security Council to act.”). 
11 In recent years, the U.S. government has been willing to consider and 
possibly adopt counterterrorism laws and policies from other countries when 
those tactics are perceived to be successful.  See, e.g., Catching Terrorists: the British 
System Versus the U.S. System: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 109th Cong. 2–29 (2006) (statements of Hon. Richard A. Posner, 
Fed. J., Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; John Yoo, Professor of Law, Boalt 
Hall Sch. of Law, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley;  Tom Parker, CEO, Halo Partnership 
Consulting, Former British counterterrorism official (commenting on the 
measures Britain has taken in combating terrorism).  Judge Posner noted his 
enthusiasm for engaging in comparative national security policy analysis:  
We must not be too proud to learn from nations such as the United 
Kingdom that have a much longer history of dealing with serious 
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Section 2 of this Article considers the challenges of relying on 
an incomplete and piecemeal definition of terrorism at the United 
Nations level in conjunction with the mandate for robust 
counterterrorism measures in United Nations member states. 
Section 3 examines from a comparative perspective how the 
United States, United Kingdom, and India have developed their 
current legal definitions of terrorism and how those definitions are 
applied by the government and law enforcement in each nation.  
By examining the history and application of these definitions, we 
can understand the value judgments and policies each of these 
nations promote as they combat terrorism domestically and 
comply with international obligations. 
Section 4 analyzes the interplay between domestic definition-
building and the policies and values promoted both by the various 
legal definitions of terrorism and the obligations under United 
Nations Resolution 1373.  This Part also considers what lessons can 
be drawn from the experience of these nations grappling with 
similar foundational questions of defining terrorism and creating 
bases for national security law and policy. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF DEFINING 
TERRORISM 
The quest to establish a universal definition of terrorism is 
entangled in questions of law, history, philosophy, morality, and 
religion.12  Many scholars believe that the definitional question is, 
 
terrorist threats than the United States has. . . .  The United Kingdom is a 
particularly apt model for us to consider in crafting our counterterrorist 
policies because our political and legal culture is derivative from 
England’s. 
Id. at 4.  I suggest that such engagement in comparative national security policy 
analysis can be quite useful when contextualized in the historical and legal 
experiences of each nation. 
12 In this Article I do not attempt to offer a new, different, or comprehensive 
definition of terrorism, as that task has been undertaken with great effort by many 
other scholars.  See, e.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 13–44 (Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1998) (describing the fluidity of terrorism’s definition throughout history 
and concluding by defining terrorism in contemporary terms as “the deliberate 
creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in 
pursuit of political change”); Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal 
Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249–50 
(2004) (examining “twenty-two definitions or descriptions of terrorism and 
related terms in federal law” and advocating an alternative, all-inclusive legal 
definition of terrorism);  Alex Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 CASE 
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by nature, a subjective one that eludes large-scale consensus.13  
Indeed, one scholar has opined:  “tell me what you think about 
terrorism, and I tell you who you are.”14  This may be true—it may 
ultimately be a futile project to define terrorism from a moral or 
philosophical perspective.  However, by nature, counterterrorism 
law and policy depends on definition.  If the international 
community or any individual state is to address the problem of 
terrorist activity, it must first define terrorism’s parameters.  This 
foundational question is of the utmost importance in determining 
who a state or international body will consider a terrorist and, 
therefore, who will be subject to the stricter laws, diminished rights 
protections, and harsher penalties that are concomitant with the 
designation of “terrorism.” 
2.1. The United Nations’ Inability to Define Terrorism 
Comprehensively 
The lack of a comprehensive and universally accepted 
definition of terrorism has been an ongoing obstacle to 
constructing a unified global stance against terrorism and, on a 
more practical level, in concretizing the meaning, implementation, 
and effect of United Nations resolutions and international treaties 
involving counterterrorism issues.15  Some scholars have suggested 
that the absence of a universal definition has hindered 
counterterrorism operations and limits the effectiveness of both 
international and domestic lawmaking efforts to counter terrorist 
activity while maintaining the rule of law and fulfilling human 
rights obligations.16   
 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of developing a 
common international definition of terrorism and attempting to provide for an 
operative definition). 
13 See e.g., Perry, supra note 12, at 252 (positing that terrorism’s “lack of 
definitional consensus” most likely stems from the word’s negative judgmental 
associations); Schmid, supra note 12, at 396 (indicating that it would be difficult to 
reach a universal consensus on the definition of terrorism because any definition 
would shaped by one’s ideological biases or political preferences). 
14 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 396 (quoting U.S. historian J. Bowyer Bell). 
15 See id. at 378–80 (discussing the international challenges of fighting 
terrorism absent an agreed-upon definition). 
16 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism [hereinafter U.N. Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights], ¶¶ 26–27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98 (Sept. 28, 
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To some extent, the international community has managed to 
work around the lack of a comprehensive definition through the 
adoption of various international treaties, Security Council 
resolutions, and United Nations protocols addressing international 
terrorism and the obligation of states to use robust 
counterterrorism measures.17  However, lack of a uniform and 
universally accepted definition, coupled with a mandate for strong 
counterterrorism laws and policies, has opened the door for 
potential abuse by member states in those areas in which the 
piecemeal international definition does not provide clarity.  This 
potential for abuse has only been partially ameliorated by recent 
efforts of the Security Council to ensure member states’ adherence 
to human rights obligations and to increase transparency in the 
process of designating terrorist organizations.18 
The United Nations has attempted to establish an 
internationally accepted definition of terrorism numerous times 
 
2005) (Martin Scheinin) (proposing that the lack of a concrete definition of 
terrorism results in unaddressed terrorist acts and may sometimes encourage 
states to commit unjustifiable abuses under the pretext of combating terrorism);  
see also Schmid, supra note 12, at 379 (describing ways in which the lack of a 
definition of  terrorism renders it difficult to carry out effective counterterrorist 
policies in the international realm).  Others have suggested that certain countries, 
including the United States, have leveraged the ambiguity of the definition of 
terrorism to promote hegemonic foreign policy objectives by setting up an 
objective of defeating “terrorism” without being limited by a particular definition 
of what they are opposing.  See generally Alexander J. Marcopoulos, Terrorizing 
Rhetoric: The Advancement of U.S. Hegemony Through the Lack of a Definition 
of ‘Terror’, (Jan. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=alexander
_marcopoulos (arguing that the United States has taken liberty with the ambiguity 
inherent in terrorism’s definition in order to advance its own hegemonic 
objectives). 
17 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 391–92 (remarking that interpreting the 
existing body of universal conventions and protocols together as an aggregate 
whole might provide a useful framework for loosely defining terrorism). 
18 The Special Rapporteur noted that: 
Calls by the international community to combat terrorism, without 
defining the term, can be understood as leaving it to individual States to 
define what is meant by the term.  This carries the potential for 
unintended human rights abuses and even the deliberate misuse of the 
term.  Besides situations where some States resort to the deliberate 
misuse of the term, the Special Rapporteur is also concerned about the 
more frequent adoption in domestic anti-terrorism legislation of 
terminology that is not properly confined to the countering of terrorism. 
U.N. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶ 27. 
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since the 1960s.19  The General Assembly repeatedly resolved to 
create a universally agreed upon definition.  In this vein, a 1987 
resolution noted that “the effectiveness of the struggle against 
terrorism could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally 
agreed definition of international terrorism.”20  Each effort, 
however, failed based on the perceived subjectivity of any such 
definition,21 as certain elements of a proposed definition were 
rejected by various nations whose interests were not served.22   
Some nations emphasized the need to except freedom fighting, 
anti-colonial uprisings, or other related violence from the 
definition of terrorism.23  Other nations focused on the desire to 
 
19 The search for a supranational definition of terrorism dates at least back to 
1937, when the League of Nations considered the Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1938, 19 League of Nations O. J. 23.  
Article 1(2) of the proposed Convention defined terrorism as “criminal acts 
directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the 
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.”  Id. art. 
1(2).  See also Schmid, supra note 12, at 385 (noting that the proposed definition for 
terrorism was neither adopted by the League of Nations nor later considered for 
adoption by the U.N. at its founding).  In a similar vein to Resolution 1373, many 
of the remaining Articles of the proposed League of Nations Convention called for 
Member States to criminalize various acts that constitute or support terrorism and 
to share information with other Member States to strengthen counterterrorism 
operations. 
20 G.A. Res. 42/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/159 (Dec. 17, 1987).  This 
resolution emphasized the importance of combating terrorism, but also 
recognized the need to do so in a manner that protects human rights and 
recognizes the right to self-determination for oppressed peoples.  Id. ¶¶ 8, 14. 
21 See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 31 (noting that “the decision to call someone 
or label some organization ‘terrorist’ becomes almost unavoidably subjective, 
depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the 
person/group/cause concerned”). 
22 The General Assembly created an ad hoc committee to create an 
international convention on the prevention of terrorist violence.  See G.A. Res. 
51/210, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996) (establishing an ad hoc 
group to address terrorist bombings, “and thereafter to address means of further 
developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with 
international terrorism”).  Although the ad hoc committee has made significant 
progress in developing a comprehensive convention, efforts at the foundational 
question of defining terrorism have stalled the process.  See U.N. Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶ 29 (reporting that disagreement over 
the definition of “terrorist offenses” within the ad hoc group remained as the 
primary issue preventing a final draft convention on terrorism).  
23 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 386 (noting disagreement at the U.N. ad hoc 
committee between member nations negotiating the definition of terrorism, with 
some members arguing for a distinction between freedom-fighting and terrorism).  
Political actors have argued that this type of anti-occupation violence—
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exclude state-sponsored actions from definitions of terrorism.24  On 
one hand, inability to reach consensus on the definition of 
terrorism reflects an ideological split and a reluctance of certain 
states to conform to the outlook and agenda of politically powerful 
nations.25  On the other hand, because most definitions include 
common core elements, such as a condemnation of the purposeful 
 
particularly when considered in the historical perspective of revolutionary 
movements—should be treated by law and international policy as distinct from 
terrorism.  Yasser Arafat for instance, has advanced this argument: 
The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the 
reason for which each fights.  For whoever stands by a just cause and 
fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the 
settlers and the colonialists cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise 
the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British 
colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against 
the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and 
Latin American peoples would also be terrorism, and many of you who 
are in this Assembly hall were considered terrorists.  This is actually a 
just and proper struggle consecrated by the United Nations Charter and 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  As to those who fight 
against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and 
oppress other people, those are the terrorists.  Those are the people 
whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war 
criminals: for the justice of the cause determines the right to struggle. 
Yasser Arafat, Chairman, Exec. Comm. Palestinian Liberation Org., Speech before 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2282nd plen. 
mtg. at 861, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2282 and Corr. 1 (Nov. 13, 1974).  But see 
HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 20 (describing the Armenian nationalist movement’s 
tactics against the ruling Turkish power in the 1880s and 1890s as a “terrorist 
strategy” of “repeated attacks on its colonial administration and security forces, in 
order to rally indigenous support, as well as to attract international attention, 
sympathy and support”). 
24 See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 35 (arguing that state-sponsored actions 
may be distinguished from terrorism because such actions can be deemed 
violations of international law or military rules of engagement and prosecuted 
accordingly as war crimes).  But see Syria Hits Out at ‘Terrorist’ US, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 28, 2008, 00:38 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7693583.stm 
(noting that Syria’s foreign minister described a U.S. military helicopter bombing 
of a Syrian town as a “terrorist” attack). 
25 That some post-colonial nations have resisted the imposition of 
international norms of the United States and European nations in the context of 
counterterrorism law and policy is unsurprising given the perceptions of 
differentiated (and lesser) legitimacy accorded to post-colonial nations in 
discourses surrounding international rule-making.  See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial 
Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The 
Unending War Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 10–15 
(2010) (describing the history of the relationship between colonialism and modern 
international law and its negative effects on “colonized and dominated polities”). 
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killing of civilians, the lack of international consensus can be 
viewed primarily as reflecting concern not over just the parameters 
of the definition, but the legal effects of falling within that 
definition.26 
2.2. How 1373 Demands a Definition that Does Not Fully Exist 
In the last twenty years, numerous international treaties and 
United Nations resolutions have addressed the need for 
counterterrorism measures without fully answering the 
fundamental and ultimately frustrating question of how to define 
terrorism.27 
Perhaps the most striking of those measures is Security Council 
Resolution 1373,28 adopted in the weeks after the September 11 
attacks under great pressure from the United States government.29  
 
26 See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an International Crime, in ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM, 213, 213–14 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 
2004) (describing the traditional notion that terrorism cannot carry a universal 
definition and can only be characterized by certain discrete acts).  Given the 
concerns of moral relativism that pervade any debate about the definition of 
terrorism, some believe that defining terrorism may neither be possible nor useful.  
See, e.g., Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of 
Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1988–92 (2006) (analyzing arguments that 
consider whether terrorism cannot, and should not be, defined). 
27 See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998) 
(requesting that obligations be carried out with consideration for “principles of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity”); see also S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368 (Sep. 12, 2001) (condemning the attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
emphasizing a zero tolerance approach to international terrorism without 
expressly defining terrorism); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 
1999) (reaffirming the obligation of all Member States to take counterterrorism 
measures against those who organize or prepare terrorist acts but providing no 
definition of terrorism); S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998) 
(condemning embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and, without 
defining terrorism, reaffirming Member States’ duty to take measures against 
international terrorism). 
28 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1. 
29 See Scheppele, supra note 10, at 455 (“It is no coincidence that UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001, mirrors almost exactly the 
strategy for fighting terrorism that one sees in the USA PATRIOT Act, which the 
US was drafting at the same time as it was urging the Security Council to act.”); 
see also Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: 
Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 284 (“A U.S. initiative, 
the unanimous passage of Resolution 1373 was remarkably smooth.”).  Johnstone 
notes that some were skeptical of the measures passed by the Security Council in 
the immediate aftermath of September 11, describing them as the imposition of 
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Resolution 1373, in an arguably unprecedented step for the 
Security Council,30 mandates that member states combat terrorism 
in numerous ways, work cooperatively with other member states 
to share information related to security issues, and report to the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee—established for the purpose of 
overseeing progress in fulfilling the mandate of Resolution 1373.31 
Two serious shortcomings are immediately apparent in the 
framework established by Resolution 1373, though.  First, although 
Resolution 1373 mandates that member states take serious action to 
counter terrorism, it lacks a definition of terrorism that would 
establish the parameters for the implementation of 
counterterrorism efforts.  Second, although Resolution 1373 
established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to oversee 
implementation of Resolution 1373 requirements by member 
states, there is no textual obligation in the resolution for the CTC to 
safeguard human rights and the rule of law.32  The lack of initial 
focus on rights protection was only later remedied after pressure 
from interests concerned with human rights.33  Such pressure led to 
 
“hegemonic international law.”  See id. at 275 (citing Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic 
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 843 (2001)). 
30 Scheppele, supra note 1, at 91–93 (detailing both the sweeping powers 
given to the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the worrying gaps in human 
rights it leaves unanswered). 
31 See About the Counter-Terrorism Committee, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMM., http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html (last 
updated May 10, 2011, 12:31 pm) (describing The Counter-Terrorism Committee’s 
responsibility for monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1373). 
32 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (establishing The Counter-Terrorism 
Committee and its power to implement Resolution 1373); see also E.J. Flynn, The 
Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 371, 377 (2007) (noting that Resolution 1373 “made scant express reference to 
human rights”).  Flynn notes that the first Chair of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, opined in 2002 that dealing with human rights 
concerns was not within the purview of the Committee: 
The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor the 
implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).  Monitoring performance 
against other international conventions, including human rights law, is 
outside the scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate.  But 
we will remain aware of the interaction with human rights concerns, and 
we will keep ourselves briefed as appropriate.  It is, of course, open to 
other organizations to study States’ reports and take up their content in 
other forums. 
Id. at 377 (quoting Sir Jeremy Greenstock). 
33 See Flynn, supra note 32, at 376–77 (noting that lobbying of the CTC by the 
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passage of additional resolutions34 that served to remind both the 
CTC and member states of their obligations under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights35 as well as other protocols.  
Despite subsequent remedial efforts to counter the initial 
inattention to human rights and rule of law concerns, the effect of 
Resolution 1373 was immediate and profound.36  In the wake of the 
passage of Resolution 1373, numerous countries with no working 
or legal definition of terrorism sought to define terrorism as a 
predicate to comply with the counterterrorism obligations of 
Resolution 1373.  Some nations simply indicated that they were 
implementing Resolution 1373 with no definitional parameters.37  
 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and other groups led the Committee 
to adopt “a line by which it would ‘remain aware’ of human rights concerns”); see 
also U.N. S.C. Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 Concerning 
Counter-Terrorism, Conclusions for Policy Guidance Regarding Human Rights 
and the CTC, U.N. Doc. S/AC.40/2006/PG.2 (May 25, 2006) (setting forth the 
CTC’s framework for addressing human rights concerns in conjunction with the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).  
34 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1624, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sep. 14, 2005) (stating 
that the U.N. Security Council “[s]tresses that States must ensure that any 
measures taken to implement [counterterrorism obligations] comply with all of 
their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights 
law, refugee law, and humanitarian law”); S.C. Res. 1456, ¶¶ 4(iii), 6, 8, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (emphasizing the importance of combating terrorism 
using best practices and in conjunction with protection of human rights); see also 
U.N. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶¶ 53–54. 
(emphasizing Security Council resolutions requiring the CTC to account for 
human rights in carrying out its objectives in years following Resolution 1373’s 
passage).  
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, part III, 19 December, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (listing the substantive and procedural rights guaranteed 
under the Convention). 
36 The governance of supranational bodies, such as the European Union, was 
profoundly affected by the passage of Resolution 1373.  E.g., EU AT UN, REPORT ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, S407/08, at 2 (2008) 
available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en 
/081211_EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf (“Everything the EU has done in the 
field of security has been linked to UN objectives.”); see Case C-266/05 P, Sison v. 
Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-1270, ¶¶ 78–79  (denying a citizen request for government 
documents and finding support in Resolution 1373’s call for international 
collaboration in fighting terrorism). 
37 See, e.g., HOME DEP’T, THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: A REPORT BY LORD 
CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C. INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION, 2007, 
Cm. 7052, ¶ 18, tbl. 1 (U.K.) [hereinafter CARLILE] (listing countries’ individual 
definitions of terrorism, including those countries which have not provided their 
own individual definitions). 
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Other nations declined to define terrorism but indicated that they 
were complying with international treaties and other obligations 
that mandated counterterrorism efforts.38 
Other countries, such as the United States, relied upon the 
definitions of terrorism under domestic law to submit reports back 
to the Counter-Terrorism Committee—these reports do not 
actually offer a definition of terrorism, but detail the robust 
counterterrorism efforts being made by the government.  In late 
2001, the twenty-five page U.S. report highlighted the legal 
frameworks put in place to combat terrorism and terrorism 
financing39 and underscored the seriousness of the punishments 
for crimes of terrorism,40 but offered no discussion of human rights 
concerns41 and little explication of the domestic definition of 
terrorism on which these efforts were predicated.42 
 
38 See, e.g., id. (identifying nations such as Albania and Estonia that rely upon 
parameters of international treaties to serve as a proxy for a legal definition of 
terrorism). 
39 U.N. Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Letter dated Dec. 19, 
2001, from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1220 (Sep. 28, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. 
2001 CTC submission].  
40 U.S. 2001 CTC submission, supra note 39, at 17 (noting that “[t]errorist acts 
are among the most serious offenses under U.S. law.  Violent, terrorist-related 
crimes generally carry substantially higher criminal penalties and can lead to 
imposition of the death penalty, or life imprisonment.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2332(a), 2332(b)). 
41 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 3(f) (calling upon member states to 
“[t]ake appropriate measures in conformity with . . . national and international 
law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee 
status”); see also id. ¶ 3(g) (calling upon member states to “[e]nsure, in conformity 
with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, 
organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts”). 
42 Parts of the report include discussion of specific acts contained within the 
definition of terrorism or “terrorist activity.”  E.g., U.S. 2001 CTC submission, 
supra note 39, at 7 (noting that under Executive Order 12947, the President 
designated sixteen organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations based on the 
commission, or risk of commission, of “acts of violence with the purpose or effect 
of disrupting the Middle East peace process”); see also, e.g., id. at 15 (for the 
purposes of immigration law, terrorist activity includes:  
[H]ijacking; sabotage; detention under threat for the purpose of coercion 
. . . ; violent attack on an internationally protected person; assassination; 
the use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons; or the use of 
explosives, firearms, or any other weapon or dangerous device with the 
intent to cause harm to individuals or damage to property). 
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2.3. Resolution 1566: Working Around a Lack of Definition 
Without an official definition of terrorism to work with, the 
United Nations Security Council has established partial measures:  
either by enacting resolutions that condemn acts of terrorism 
without defining the parameters of terrorism,43 or by including 
general descriptions of acts that fall within the rubric of terrorist 
activity without purporting to fully define terrorism.  Security 
Council Resolution 1566, passed in 2004, clearly falls into the latter 
category.44  It reaffirms its condemnation of the terrorist activity of 
the Afghan Taliban,45 reminds Member States of their 
counterterrorism obligations under previous Security Council 
resolutions,46 notes the requirement to comply with international 
humanitarian law in combating terrorism,47 and reminds Member 
States of the supranational counterterrorism committees and 
 
43 E.g., S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 27 (condemning the attacks of September 11, 
2001, but not defining terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 
(Oct. 15, 1999) (condemning the actions of the Taliban and reaffirming the 
obligation of all Member States to take counterterrorism measures without 
defining what constitutes terrorist activity). 
44 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 393 (noting that S.C. Res. 1566 came about 
because of the lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism by the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Terrorism within the General Assembly). 
45 See S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (condemning 
all forms of terrorism, regardless of its motivations).  
46 See id. ¶ 2 (urging states to combat terrorism and adhere to international 
law).  Resolution 1566 does not speak to the question of whether national 
governments can be considered to have committed terrorist acts, but adopts a 
zero-tolerance stance that rules out an exception for freedom fighters or other 
anti-colonial or anti-occupation violence, noting that terrorist violence is “under 
no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature . . . .”  Id. ¶ 3.  This 
same view is echoed in other Security Council resolutions that condemn terrorist 
acts.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2005) 
(condemning terrorism “irrespective of [its] motivation, whenever and by 
whomsoever committed”); S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999) 
(emphasizing the need to intensify the fight against terrorism).  The Council of 
Europe also adopted this view in its 2005 Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism.  See Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 
pmbl., May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. no. 196 (noting that “terrorist offences and the 
offences set forth in this Convention, by whoever perpetrated, are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”). 
47 See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 45, at 1 (urging states to adopt measures to 
fight terrorism in accordance with international human rights, refugee, and 
humanitarian law).  
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structures that have been established pursuant to previous Security 
Council Resolutions.48  Then Resolution 1566 goes further, offering 
a partial explanation of a terrorist act as: 
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with 
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking 
of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in 
the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of 
and as defined in the international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism . . . .49 
Although seemingly expansive, Resolution 1566 limits the use 
of the label of “terrorism” to offenses that are recognized in 
previously agreed upon international conventions and protocols, 
thereby tethering the implementation of Resolution 1566 to 
offenses commonly understood to fall under the umbrella of 
terrorism.50  Further, the language of the resolution limits its 
application to acts that are intended to provoke terror and/or 
compel a political response from a government.51  In framing the 
parameters of terrorism in such a way, the Security Council 
appears to have—at least for the purposes of Resolution 1566 and 
the other United Nations’ measures that are referenced in 
Resolution 1566—worked around the lack of consensus on this 
issue in the General Assembly. 
In terms of rights protection, in addition to the Counter-
Terrorism Committee taking into account the obligation of 
Member States to adhere to human rights standards52 and the 
 
48 See id. (calling on states to cooperate with the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban 
Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267, in 
the fight against terrorism). 
49 Id. ¶ 3.  
50 See id. (noting that the resolution applies to “offences within the scope of 
and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism”). 
51 See id. (including the condemnation of threats to international 
organizations).  
52 The Counter-Terrorism Committee initially disclaimed any responsibility 
for dealing with the human rights concerns that resulted from the implementation 
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limiting language within Resolution 1566, the Security Council has 
also designated an Ombudsperson to field petitions from 
individuals and organizations seeking to be delisted from being 
subject to international sanctions as terrorists.53  Concerned about 
the severe repercussions of being designated as a terrorist, various 
Member States moved for a process by which the designation 
process could be made more fair and transparent, allow for a 
delisting process for individuals and organizations, and strengthen 
international security by improving the perceived legitimacy of the 
United Nations as an international regulator of security matters.54 
What do the partial definition and the ameliorating measures 
mean in terms of the trajectory of post-September 11 
counterterrorism initiatives being undertaken by the United 
Nations?  First, a number of Security Council resolutions make 
clear that those defined as terrorists will be (or should be) dealt 
with severely by Member States who are obligated by resolution or 
protocol to adopt and implement robust counterterrorism 
measures. 
Second, although the Security Council has set some parameters 
for terrorism, resolutions such as 1373 necessarily rely on domestic 
legal definitions of terrorism to support counterterrorism efforts in 
each Member State.  Again, because of this reliance on domestic 
law, which may ignore or circumvent consideration of human 
rights issues, the Counter-Terrorism Committee has taken on the 
role of mandating that member states adhere to their human rights 
obligations in the implementation of Resolution 1373. 
Finally, because of the harsh measures that result from terrorist 
designation, the General Assembly has taken steps in recent years 
 
of Resolution 1373.  See, e.g., Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 333, 
340 (2003) (addressing the challenge of combating terrorism while still protecting 
human rights).  
53 See S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009) (mandating 
that “when considering delisting requests, the Committee shall be assisted by an 
Office of the Ombudsperson”).  
54 E.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Amends United 
Nations Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Regime, Authorizes Appointment of 
Ombudsperson to Handle Delisting Issues, ¶ 14, U.N. Press Release SC/9825 
(Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press 
/docs/2009/sc9825.doc.htm (noting the concern of delegations from various 
nations that the process of designating terrorists be made more accessible, 
transparent, and equitable). 
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to ensure some transparency and due process to delist individuals 
and organizations that are inappropriately designated as terrorists. 
Each post-September 11th counterterrorism measure taken by 
the United Nations has, at a later point, been moderated using 
measures that lessen the potential for abuse.  Nonetheless, because 
Member States’ international obligations depend on domestic 
definitions of terrorism, the potential for abuse that concerned the 
United Nations continues to exist at the domestic level. 
3. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES:  TRACKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM 
The lack of certainty surrounding the definition of terrorism 
and the Security Council mandate for counterterrorism measures 
on both an international and domestic basis compels consideration 
of how individual nations facing severe national security threats 
define terrorism, where those definitions come from, and how they 
are applied. 
In each of the countries examined in this section, the lack of a 
comprehensive definition on the global level has given rise to the 
potential for abuse of human rights and deviation from the rule of 
law as by-products of the effort to fight terrorism.55 
3.1. United States 
In the United States, federal law and agencies utilize dozens of 
different definitions of terrorism,56 largely based on the agenda and 
 
55 As noted previously, this concern has been discussed at some length by 
various United Nations Special Rapporteurs.  See U.N. Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶ 27 (“[R]epeated calls by the international 
community for action to eliminate terrorism, in the absence of a universal and 
comprehensive definition of the term, may give rise to adverse consequences for 
human rights.”); Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protect. 
of Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, In Particular 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 (June 25, 
2004) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing terrorists and terrorist activity from 
legitimate actors and actions in instances of armed conflict generally). 
56 See Perry, supra note 12, at 249–50 (examining twenty-two definitions of 
terrorism under U.S. federal law).  This plethora of federal definitions has led 
government officials over the decades to note that the United States lacks an 
official definition of terrorism, and that terrorism is “a phenomenon that is easier 
to describe than define.”  GEORGE H. W. BUSH, PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM 1 (1986). 
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focus of the drafter of the definition.57  In this section, I consider 
two definitions58—each used for different but related purposes by 
the U.S. government—to evaluate the history and the application 
of the definition.  In the post-September 11 era, the political 
pressure to combat terrorism and to accommodate the 
undermining of civil liberties as a by-product of a robust 
counterterrorism program has influenced the definitions of 
terrorism as well as the scope of their application.59   
 
57 See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 38 (discussing how the U.S. State 
Department’s and U.S. Defense Department’s definitions of terrorism suit each 
agency’s needs to fulfill its mission); Perry, supra note 12, at 270 (noting that “[i]t is 
logical that different standards are used for making determinations relating to 
vastly different public-policy objectives” in the immigration, surveillance and 
insurance coverage contexts).  Notably, the use of the label of “terrorism” in the 
immigration and deportation context has been inappropriate, unjust, and overly 
harsh in many situations.  See generally CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL 
JUSTICE & ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, UNDER THE RADAR: MUSLIMS 
DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED TERRORISM ALLEGATIONS 2 
(2011) (remarking that “religious, cultural, and political affiliation . . . of Muslims 
are being construed as dangerous terrorism-related factors to justify detention, 
deportation, and denial of immigration benefits”).  
58 A third definition that is relevant to international efforts of 
counterterrorism is that contained in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006).  See 22 U.S.C. § 
2656f(d)(2) (2006) (defining terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets”).  This definition is used by 
the State Department for reporting purposes in response to the requirements of 
Resolution 1373 and other international obligations.  The definition in 22 U.S.C. § 
2656f(d)(2) is narrower in scope than the other definitions of terrorism that are 
considered in this Article in several ways.  First, the definition limits the label of 
“terrorism” to violent acts which are premeditated and politically motivated, and 
which are “perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.”  22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2).  It also does not include military 
targets and appears to exclude most state actors, even those that commit acts that 
are considered to be criminal by the international community, such as the mass 
killings in the Darfur region of Sudan.  See generally Matthew H. Charity, The 
Criminalized State: The International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, and 
Darfur, Republic of Sudan, 37 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 67 (2011) (treating the situation in 
Darfur as an example of a State failing its responsibility to protect its population, a 
recognized expectation of the United Nations).  Although the narrow construction 
of the definition of terrorism in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) is of interest, it is beyond 
the scope of this Article’s analysis of how such definitions are used by the 
government in the domestic context where potential criminal sanctions may 
apply. 
59 The label of “terrorism” has been applied by government officials in 
numerous contexts that are far removed from the violent acts that are at the heart 
of the legal definitions of terrorism.  See, e.g., Letter from New York City Bar 
Association, to Sen. Patrick Leahy et al. (July 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/AETA_Animal&CivilRights_Letter072109.p
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3.1.1.  The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
Relative to post-September 11 legislative definitions, the 
definition of terrorism contained in the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)60 is limited in scope 
and application, and contains important due process protections 
for individuals and designated groups.  Under the AEDPA, 
terrorism is defined as:   
An activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous 
to human life, property, or infrastructure, and appears to be 
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or to affect the conduct of government by mass 
destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.61   
This definition is more limited than that of the Patriot Act, but 
its application is broader than that of the 1995 Executive Order 
 
df (noting that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act should be repealed in part 
due to the misapplication of the label of “terrorism” to acts which destroy mink-
farming equipment); Timothy Williams, New York’s Post-9/11 Terrorism Law is Used 
to Convict a Bronx Gang Member in a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at B1 
(discussing the conviction of St. James Boys gang member Edgar Morales under 
New York terrorism laws aimed at international terrorism organizations). 
60 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (codified in scatter sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) 
(authorizing the Secretary to designate foreign organizations as terrorists if they 
engage in terrorist activity as defined by the statute).  The AEDPA was enacted in 
response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and the 1995 bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City as part of a broader plan to 
prevent material support to terrorists that was seen as essential to those 
bombings.  See JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM 25 (2007) (describing the effects of the World Trade 
Center bombings, the Oklahoma City bombings, and the congressional 
investigation into federal law enforcement actions in Waco on the passage of 
AEDPA).  Congress also passed the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) in conjunction with the 
AEDPA as part of a larger counterterrorism effort.  Notably, however, the 
Oklahoma City bombing was committed by a white U.S. citizen, prompting some 
scholars to question whether the passage of the IIRIRA was a thinly veiled 
racialization of terrorism.  See Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 
World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. 
REV. 717, 725–26 (noting that George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration 
of racial profiling in conjunction with counter-terrorism efforts in the 1990s). 
61 See Exec. Order No. 13224, 31 C.F.R. 594 (explaining Congressional 
findings and purpose).  
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which preceded it and which applied specifically to the context of 
the Middle East peace process being negotiated at the time.62  The 
AEDPA, in contrast, is a wide-reaching statute, defining terrorism 
for the purpose of designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs)—regardless of whether such organizations were related to 
the peace process in the Middle East—and freezing the assets of 
such organizations.63  
Under the AEDPA, a specific process must be undertaken to 
designate an organization as an FTO.  It is a process that is open to 
critique as being insufficiently rights-protective, but also 
incorporates some important safeguards against abuse.64  Once the 
FTO designation has been made by the State Department, limited 
 
62 See Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995) (finding that foreign 
terrorist activities threaten peace of the Middle East and United States).  Section 1 
of this Executive Order empowers the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to designate foreign persons 
who intend to disrupt the Middle East peace process as individuals with whom all 
financial transactions are to be blocked.  See supra § 1 (prohibiting any 
contribution of funds, goods, or services to such persons).  
63 See, e.g., AEDPA §§ 219(a)(1)(A)-(C), 219(a)(2)(C) (codified in 8 USC 
§1189(a)) (finding that anyone who interacts with FTOs is violating the statute, 
and authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the assets of entities 
designated as FTOs).  President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,947 in January 
1995, which was geared toward facilitating a peace agreement in the Middle East, 
but gave broad authority to cabinet departments to designate Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs) with the purpose of disrupting their financial and 
operational capabilities, thereby laying the foundation for the authority granted 
under the AEDPA and Executive Order 13,224.  See Exec. Order No. 12,947, supra 
note 62 (establishing authority for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the 
Treasury to limit property rights of designated terrorists).  Executive Order 13,224, 
signed by President George W. Bush in the weeks after the September 11 attacks, 
reinforces the authority of the President and the Secretary of State, and authorizes 
the Secretary of the Treasury to designate and isolate Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations.  See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002) (finding it 
necessary to utilize financial sanctions against foreign terrorists).  The Executive 
Order also adds various organizations to the list of FTOs.  See Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct 
/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited October 15, 2011) (listing forty-nine 
organizations designated as FTOs by the State Department). 
64 See AEDPA § 219(a) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)) (establishing both the 
procedure used for designation as a terrorist organization as well as congressional 
and judicial means available to pursue designations review and revocation); see 
also Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations: The Effect on Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 
J. 547, 556–58 (2008) (arguing that the designation process contravenes due 
process guarantees). 
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procedural safeguards are available, after which the designation is 
finalized.65 
Because the consequences of FTO designation can be severe66—
for example, financial intuitions may block or freeze assets of an 
FTO,67 individuals may be barred from entry into the United 
States,68 and material support to such an organization is a criminal 
offense carrying potentially lengthy prison sentences69—the 
procedural safeguards, however limited, are crucial. 
One such safeguard in the FTO designation process is the 
opportunity to contest the designation proposed by the State 
Department.  This layer of judicial review protects against 
arbitrariness in the designation,70 and requires some disclosure of 
the basis upon which the State Department made its 
determination.71 
 
65 Under AEDPA, the Secretary of State notifies leaders in Congress and 
gives notice to designees in the Federal Register.  AEDPA § 302(a)(2)(A) (codifed 
as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)).  FTOs then have 30 days to challenge their 
designation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court.  § 
302(b).  Such cases, usually based on allegations of an abuse of discretion by the 
State Department or a lack of substantial support for the FTO designation, are 
largely unsuccessful.  E.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 
F.3d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding FTO designation based on classified 
evidence and emphasizing deference to the State Department in the FTO 
designation process); See also United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(Kozinski, A., dissenting) (arguing against the majority’s denial of a petition of a  
defendant who convicted of contributing funds to an FTO, and noting that 
individual defendants are statutorily barred from contesting the designation of an 
FTO). 
66 See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 196 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the severe impact of FTO designation). 
67 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2) (2006). 
68 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V) (2006). 
69 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).  The constitutionality of the FTO designation 
process authorized by Executive Order No. 13,224 and various statutes was 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder.  
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
70 Under the AEDPA, courts have the power to set aside the State 
Department designation of an FTO if it is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion, or if it is not based on substantial evidence.  AEDPA § 302(b)(3) 
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3)).  Courts have, however, been extremely 
deferential to the State Department, choosing not to review classified evidence in 
some instances, but relying instead on State Department affirmations of 
substantial evidence to support its designation decision.  E.g., People’s Mojahedin 
Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1244. 
71 E.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 613 
F.3d 220, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the government had violated due 
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A second important safeguard is the mandatory review and 
renewal process for the Secretary of State.72  If no State Department 
review has been made of an FTO designation for five years, the 
Secretary of State must review the listing to determine whether it 
should be revoked due to a change in the organization’s mission 
and actions, or a change in the national security assessment by the 
United States.73  These safeguards echo the review and delisting 
process that the United Nations adopted in order to ensure that 
terrorists are being appropriately identified and that the 
ramifications of being designated a terrorist, however severe, are 
applied appropriately and with due consideration.74  
3.1.2. Patriot Act  
The USA PATRIOT Act,75 passed in the weeks immediately 
following the September 11 attacks, offered a panoply of 
counterterrorism resources to the government, including an 
increase in surveillance powers76 and government authority to 
conduct intelligence-gathering operations in matters of suspected 
terrorism,77 as well as allowing for the civil seizure of assets based 
 
process by failing to give an FTO the opportunity to view unclassified evidence 
prior to making a final decision denying petition to revoke designation as an 
FTO). 
72 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C), (a)(6) (2006). 
73 Id. 
74 In some respects, the FTO designation process and the opportunity for 
organizations to be delisted are an early example of the current, more rights-
protective procedural safeguards now being mandated by the United Nations.  In 
the landmark European Court of Justice decision of Kadi, the court found that the 
fundamental right to due process related to the determination that an individual 
or organization was subject to sanctions under U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1267 could not be contravened.  See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi 
& Al Barakaat v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-6411 (2008).  This decision made clear that 
the determination that sanctions must be accompanied—like the U.S. FTO 
designation process—by a meaningful opportunity to contest the designation.  See 
id. ¶ 318 (noting that due process is a fundamental right under European 
Community standards and it cannot be stripped by a regulation or court). 
75 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot 
Act]. 
76 See id. § 218 (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
such that electronic surveillance and physical searches need only be justified in 
“significant” part by the goal of obtaining foreign intelligence). 
77 Id. § 901. 
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only on probable cause,78 and heightened punishments for any of 
the underlying crimes related to the newly broadened 
understanding of “domestic terrorism,” which includes:   
[A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State [that] 
appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.79 
Notably, this definition of domestic terrorism was not created 
ad hoc in the weeks after the September 11 attacks.  Instead, under 
intense pressure to amend various existing criminal statutes to 
broaden and strengthen the government’s resources before another 
attack potentially took place, Congress moved quickly80 to revamp 
the existing counterterrorism framework.81 
The definition of terrorism used in the Patriot Act was 
imported from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
 
78 Id. § 806. 
79 Id. § 802.  Critics of this broad definition have noted that such language 
could encompass numerous activist groups, including Greenpeace, protestors of 
the World Trade Organization, Operation Rescue, and protesters of bomb-testing 
facilities on the island of Vieques.  See How the USA PATRIOT Act redefines 
“Domestic Terrorism,” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2002), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-
terrorism (analyzing the effect of the Patriot Act definition of terrorism if the 
government applied the act to Vieques protesters). 
80 See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS 
AND LIBERTY 11 (2008) (arguing that the legislative role in safeguarding civil 
liberties is hampered by the political reality that legislators must be seen as 
reacting quickly to a terrorist attack).  
81 See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASHINGTON POST 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 27, 2002, at 6, 10 (describing the pressured deliberations of 
Congress and the executive branch in drafting the Patriot Act); See also 147 CONG. 
REC. 20,700–02 (2001) (statement of Senator Russell Feingold) (noting that 
Congress had been under “relentless” pressure from the administration to pass 
the Patriot Act legislation “without deliberation or debate”).  Unlike deliberations 
on most bills, the Senate did not conduct committee hearings by the Senate and 
the House of Representatives held only one hearing at which the sole witness was 
Attorney General John Ashcroft.  See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 1–2 (describing 
rushed legislative effort to pass Patriot Act in the aftermath of the attacks on 
September 11, 2001). 
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(FISA).82  The FISA definition of terrorism requires, among other 
elements, that the perpetrators intend the intimidation of a civilian 
population or political coercion,83 which naturally limits the 
application of the provision to certain types of acts.  Likewise, the 
government purpose at issue in FISA is limited.  The text of the 
statute84 and its legislative history make clear that FISA is meant to 
be a limited and relatively narrow statute focused only on the 
intelligence-gathering operations of the government, not for 
criminal investigations and prosecutions.85   
 
82 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2006). 
83 The definition of international terrorism in FISA includes several elements: 
that it “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal 
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;” 
that it “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the 
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping” and occur totally 
outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries.  Id. 
84 Title I of FISA, “Electronic Surveillance within the United States for 
Foreign Intelligence Purposes,” makes clear the scope of the statute’s application.  
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended in 50 U.S.C.).  Provisions within the statute limit the use of 
any intelligence gathered pursuant to the authorized surveillance.  See 50 U.S.C. § 
1806(b) (“No information acquired pursuant to this title shall be disclosed for law 
enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that 
such information . . . may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance 
authorization of the Attorney General.”). 
85 FISA’s legislative history contains numerous statements that make clear 
members of Congress considering the bill were concerned about individual 
privacy rights and limited the focus of the statute to intelligence-gathering.  For 
example, part of the legislative history states:  
It is important to note that the committee’s favorable recommendation of 
[FISA] in no way reflects any judgment that it would also be appropriate 
to depart from the standard of criminal activity as the basis for using 
other intrusive investigative techniques.  The bill does not impliedly 
authorize departure from the standard of criminality in other aspects of 
national security investigations or intelligence collection directed at 
Americans without the safeguards of judicial review and probable cause. 
S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 18 (1977).  Likewise, senators expressed a clear intent 
that the definition of terrorism is intended to be limited to acts or support of 
“serious violence—for example, purchase or surreptitious importation into the 
United States of explosives, planning for assassinations, or financing of or training 
for such activities.”  S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 26 (1978).  The range of actions 
considered to be “terrorism” under FISA is broader than a single criminal act, but 
not as broad as current understandings, as recently demonstrated by the Supreme 
Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which upheld criminalization of 
material support to humanitarian and non-violent activities of a designated 
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Given the far-reaching consequences of being suspected of 
terrorism and the broad powers for surveillance authorized under 
FISA at the time of its enactment, Congress expressed significant 
concern over the implications of FISA on civil liberties, and the 
potential for government overreach.86  This concern led to 
numerous safeguards beyond the limited scope of application of 
the legislation, including the reporting requirements of the 
Attorney General to Congress regarding the nature and extent of 
FISA-based surveillance conducted,87 the mandated minimization 
procedures to ensure that individual privacy rights are 
safeguarded to some extent,88 and the penalties available to punish 
those who conduct unlawful and overreaching surveillance.89 
Despite the concern expressed in FISA’s legislative history 
about the spillover of FISA into the criminal investigation and 
prosecution arena, key provisions including the definition of 
terrorism itself were repurposed for insertion into criminal statutes 
with no substantial debate by Congress.  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 
2331, enacted in 199290 as the predicate for contemporaneously 
 
Foreign Terrorist Organization.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. 2705 (2010); see also Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: 
Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 
173, 200–07 (2003) (detailing the difficulty in separating terrorist activities from 
non-terrorist activities of FTOs).  
86 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 26 (1978) (noting that “[c]oncern . . . has been 
expressed that [parts of FISA] could permit surveillance solely on the basis of 
information that someone might commit acts of terrorism or sabotage in the 
distant future.  This is clearly not the intent of the committee”).  In his remarks, 
Senator Malcolm Wallop noted that the purpose of FISA was for Congress to try 
to strike a balance between civil liberties and the intelligence community’s need 
for heightened surveillance.  Id. at 91–96 (Remarks of Sen. Wallop). 
87 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807, 1808 (2006) (describing the reports required by the 
Attorney General and other congressional oversight measures). 
88 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006) (directing the use of minimization 
procedures to “minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons”); 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(C) (2006) (describing the way in 
which minimization requirements should be met); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 23 
(1977) (noting the importance of protecting liberty interests by not conducting 
surveillance on an entire group if probable cause only extends to certain 
individuals within the group). 
89 E.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809, 1810 (2006) (describing civil liability and criminal 
sanctions for breaches of FISA). 
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (adopting a definition of terrorism similar to the 
one found in FISA).  
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passed criminal measures seeking to combat terrorism, adopts the 
FISA language defining terrorism.91   
The Patriot Act amended the definition of terrorism from 18 
U.S.C. § 2331 slightly, only to broaden its scope and application 
further.92  However, the 2001 Patriot Act amendments included an 
important sunset provision—added in part because of the haste 
with which the legislation was passed—that forced Congress to 
reexamine the wisdom of the legislation at intervals of several 
years.93  Although Congress debated the renewal of certain parts of 
the Patriot Act in 2005—none of which involved the definition of 
terrorism—in March 2006, Congress renewed most provisions, 
removed the safeguard of a sunset provision, and made the 
provisions permanent.94  
The Patriot Act definition of terrorism now has an 
extraordinarily far reach, especially in light of the limited original 
application of the FISA definition to the non-criminal purpose of 
intelligence-gathering.  This repurposing and re-contextualization 
of the FISA definition of terrorism has gone unexamined by 
 
91 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, at 179–80 (1991) (noting that the definition of 
terrorism stems from FISA and noting the need to significantly expand U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts in light of numerous acts of international terrorism 
during the 1980s, including the hijacking of the Achille Lauro).  
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (including “mass destruction” as a means by which 
terrorists operate).  
93 See id. § 2510 (commenting that Section 801 of Pub. L 90-351 provided a 
sunset provision for various counterterrorism tools, including those related to 
wiretapping and surveillance); see also 147 CONG. REC. 20,695–96 (2001) (statement 
of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (noting the importance of the sunset provision in terms of 
both discouraging an abuse of power by the administration and increasing the 
incentive for Congressional oversight).  But see DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 14–15 
(arguing that provisions subject to sunset provisions are almost always renewed, 
making their efficacy as a procedural protection questionable). 
94 See JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM 31 (2007) (describing how sunset provisions were 
adopted, extended, and then removed).  Only three provisions not dealing with 
the definition of terrorism were still kept subject to the sunset provisions.  Id.  
Those provisions were extended in May 2011 until 2015.  See Paul Kane & Felicia 
Somnez, Patriot Act Amendments Signed into Law Despite Bipartisan Resistance from 
Congress, WASHPOST.COM, May 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/politics/patriot-act-extension-signed-into-law-despite-bipartisan-resistance-in-
congress/2011/05/27/AGbVlsCH_story.html (describing the extension of 
surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act).  
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Congress, yet has a profound impact as the definition triggers 
numerous effects for those caught within its scope.95 
The lack of parallel due process protections in the application 
of the Patriot Act exacerbates the problems inherent in applying 
conflicting definitions of terrorism, including the potential lack of 
notice to individuals as to whether they will be categorized as a 
terrorist and exactly what kind of conduct is prohibited.96 
 
95 Although in a different context, this repurposing and re-contextualization 
of a definition is reminiscent of the post-September 11th decision by John Yoo and 
others within the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice to cobble 
together a definition of “torture” for the purpose of setting the parameters of 
detainee treatment from non-legal dictionaries, health care statutes, and other 
sources.  See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President 5–6 (Aug. 1, 2002) (defining torture to mean severe discomfort or pain).  
Such distorted legal reasoning later came under much criticism, both from within 
the George W. Bush administration and the scholarly community.  But see 
Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L 
SEC. LAW & POL’Y 455, 464–66 (2005) (describing the shortcomings of the OLC 
memorandum, stating that “[w]hen a lawyer gives legal advice . . . she has a 
professional obligation of candor toward her client . . . .  [T]he lawyer’s role is not 
simply to spin out creative legal arguments.  It is to offer her assessment of the 
law as objectively as possible” (citing Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1 
(2003))); Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 9, 
2007, at 42 (noting that when he started at the OLC in 2003, Jack Goldsmith 
reviewed the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda and found them to be “tendentious, 
overly broad and legally flawed”). 
 To some extent, the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda reflect a Youngstown 
dilemma in that they are a product of insular, unilateralist thinking, whereas the 
definitions underpinning counterterrorism legislation are congressionally 
sanctioned.  However, the practical effect of Congress’s imprimatur is that the 
definitions are extreme; the definitional repurposing in legislation is less extreme, 
public, and largely ignored, yet still problematic. 
96 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 12, at 270 (arguing that conflicting definitions of 
terrorism could result in confusion and ambiguity); see also SUBCOMM. ON 
TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC. & HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON 
INTELLIGENCE, 107TH CONG., COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE 
PRIOR TO 9-11: A REPORT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE 
MINORITY LEADER (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress 
/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html (reviewing alternative ways to combat terrorism in 
order to prevent future attacks).  The Subcommittee’s recommendation that a 
single definition of terrorism be agreed upon by all U.S. agencies was predicated 
on a concern that a lack of uniform definition would lead to terrorist acts being 
treated identically under the law as ordinary criminal acts.  Id.  
 The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S. Ct. 2705 (2010), adds further uncertainty to the question of what individuals 
and organizations will be prosecuted under the material support statute, and on 
what basis.  See Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 
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Further, critics of the Patriot Act and the FTO designation 
process note that the post-September 11th racialized application of 
the label of terrorism to those perceived to be Muslim or Arab,97 
which only serves to foment distrust among domestic and 
international Muslim and Arab communities.98  Other critics accuse 
the government of subjectivity in the application of terrorism label 
on various actors, claiming that the designation process depends 
more on the political sympathies of politicians and targeted groups 
and individuals than objectively applied criteria.99 
 
86 IND. L.J. 543, 577–78 (2011) (describing the role of specific intent in statutes 
relating to material support of terrorists); see also Peter Margulies, Advising 
Terrorism: Hybrid Scrutiny, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech 33 (Roger Williams 
Univ. Legal Studies Research Series, Working Paper No. 101, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1777371 (arguing that the 
majority opinion failed to specify how much coordination with a foreign terrorist 
organization would lead to a violation of the federal statute prohibiting material 
support to these organizations); cf. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: 
Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 12–18 
(2005) (discussing the enactment of the material support statute). 
97 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1575–76 
(2002) (discussing the racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans after the 
September 11th attacks); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: 
Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 
725–32 (2003) (arguing that U.S. counterterrorism law and policy has intentionally 
singled out those perceived as Muslim or Arab to bear the brunt of the curtailing 
of civil liberties and human rights); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House 
Extends a Hand to Muslims Wary of Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A1 
(reporting on how hearings to be held by the House Committee on Homeland 
Security are controversial based on the perception that the government is 
equating domestic terrorism with Islam). 
98 See Tom Tyler, et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism 
Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 368, 369–70 (2010) 
(finding a “robust correlation between perceptions of procedural justice and both 
perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate among Muslim American 
communities in the context of anti-terrorism policing,” and noting that, under a 
normative model of anti-terrorism measures, “people obey the law and cooperate 
with legal authorities when they view government as legitimate and thus entitled 
to be obeyed”); see also GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, & 
TERRORISTS: LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 162–63, 168–69, 174–75 (2010) 
(discussing people’s perceptions in predominantly Muslim countries that U.S. 
foreign policy is hegemonic and anti-Islamic). 
99 See, e.g., James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 398–99 (1992) (arguing that the U.S. government acted 
inconsistently with regard to the imprisonment of Irish Republican Army 
“terrorist” Joe Doherty and the White House reception for South African 
“freedom-fighter” Nelson Mandela); see also Perry, supra note 12, at 270 (stating 
that “different standards are used for making determinations relating to vastly 
different public policy objectives”).   
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Given the subjective application of the label of terrorism100 and 
its far-reaching implications, some scholars have suggested that the 
most just resolution may be for governments to forego separate 
definitions of terrorism and rely instead on the criminalization of 
the underlying substantive acts.101  Such an overhaul of domestic 
legislation is unrealistic given the current political climate that 
militates toward the increase in legal measures taken specifically in 
the name of counterterrorism.  However, the experiences of other 
nations in defining terrorism and identifying potential abuses in 
the application of such definitions can offer insight into and 
guidance for potential improvements in the use of such definitions 
in the domestic context. 
3.2. United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom, although dealing with numerous 
internal and external threats to national security and emergency 
situations over many decades,102 did not attempt to define 
 
 The subjectivity in applying the definition of terrorism is clear in the 2007 
conviction and sentencing of gang member, Edgar Morales, under the New York 
state anti-terrorism statute—a conviction that was overturned in 2011 based on 
the appellate court’s finding of a lack of nexus between Morales’ reckless killing of 
a girl during a gang-related altercation and the legislature’s intended definition of 
terrorism.  See People v. Morales, 924 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (vacating 
the terrorism charges of Morales’ prior conviction and sentencing, decreasing 
Morales’ murder sentence, and opining that New York’s definition of terrorism 
mirrors that of FISA); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2001) 
(defining terrorism, in part, as committing a specific offense with “the intent to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population”).   
100 See Perry, supra note 12, at 271–72 (noting that the lack of precision of the 
definition of terrorism stems from political considerations, which should be kept 
separate from the legal categorizations). 
101 See id. (raising the question of necessity of a definition of terrorism and 
ultimately concluding that a lack of legal definition is unworkable and 
undesirable).  Critics of government approaches to defining terrorism note that, 
historically, the United States has designated the types of violent acts, delineated 
in the Patriot Act and the AEDPA, as criminal acts for the purpose of 
delegitimizing the actors and not giving them the cache that may be associated 
with being called a “terrorist” or “combatant.”  See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 15 
(describing the different and evolving meaning of “terrorism”); see also Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 349, 355–56 (2004) (describing dangers associated with an overly broad 
definition of “terrorist”).  
102 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2005–06 (2005) H.C. 1087, at 2 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10 
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terrorism comprehensively until relatively recently.  The definition 
is of serious practical importance as the label triggers 
governmental powers such as the right to arrest terrorism suspects 
without a warrant,103 the ability to hold an arrestee in pre-charge 
detention for up to 28 days when he is suspected of a terrorism-
related activity,104 the issuance of a control order,105 the prohibition 
against publishing statements that encourage terrorism,106 and the 
proscription of terrorist organizations.107 
The Prevention of Terrorism Acts of both 1974108 and 1989109 
attempted to define terrorism for the limited purpose of fighting 
against Catholic nationalist forces in Northern Ireland associated 
with the Troubles.110  In this context, terrorism was defined broadly 
as “the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public . . . in fear.”111  
Arguably, such a broad definition can encompass almost any act of 
 
/1087/1087.pdf (detailing the multiple bombings that killed dozens of people in 
Britain); see, e.g., CONFLICT ARCHIVE ON THE INTERNET, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2011) (describing the history of the Troubles in Northern Ireland);  
103 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41 (U.K.) (outlining that a constable has 
the power to arrest a person he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist without a 
warrant).  
104 See, e.g., Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7) (U.K.) (outlining the period in 
which warrants can be extended). 
105 See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1(1) (U.K.) (defining a 
control order as “an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him 
for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism”).  
106 See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.) (delineating what constitutes an 
encouragement of terrorism and outlining punishments for the offense). 
107 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 3 (U.K.) (allowing the Secretary of State to 
add an organization to the proscribed list if it has any activities concerning 
terrorism); see also Alexander Horne, The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed 
Organizations, SN/HA/00815 House of Commons Library, Home Affairs Section 
(Aug. 9, 2011), available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00815.pdf 
(describing the recent history and present status of “proscribed organizations” 
under the anti-terrorism legislation). 
108 See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 13, 
sch. 1 (U.K.) (defining the Irish Republican Army as a proscribed organization).  
109 See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, § 24 
(U.K.) (making further provisions to hinder the establishment of more explosives 
factories in Northern Ireland).  
110 See CONFLICT ARCHIVE ON THE INTERNET, supra note 102 (outlining past and 
current conflicts and politics affecting Northern Ireland). 
111 See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 9(1) 
(defining terrorism and other provisions in the Act).  
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violence that occurs in public, but little opposition was raised 
regarding such a definition, perhaps given the limited scope of its 
application—to a specific region and a specific context—and the 
fact that many British citizens viewed the Catholic separatists in 
Northern Ireland as an outsider group.112  To these citizens, the 
separatists did not deserve the more robust legal protections that 
would accompany a narrower definition of terrorist activity.  
3.2.1.  Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000  
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000 marks a turning point in 
British counterterrorism law and policy, as it reflects an effort to 
create a uniform counterterrorism law to apply to all parts of the 
United Kingdom, and not specifically created to deal with 
Northern Ireland113 or other specific conflict situations.114 
The definition of terrorism that Parliament adopted in the 
statute was debated at length,115 and ultimately included several 
key elements, including an ideological basis for the terrorist action 
or threat of action, a high level of seriousness of the action, and an 
element of violence broadly defined to include physical violence, 
risks to public safety and disruption of electronic systems.116   
 
112 See Setty, supra note 3, at 172 (describing the use of specialized trials for 
only particular terrorist groups).  
113 For a general discussion of the history of the Troubles, see Conflict and 
Politics in Northern Ireland, CAIN WEB SERVICE, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (chronicling the 
background, key issues and key events of the conflict).  
114 Parliament passed this legislation, in part, to comply with European 
Union requirements that anti-terrorism legislation be codified in one statute and 
that human rights concerns be addressed within comprehensive anti-terrorism 
legislation.  See The European Convention on Human Rights, 1 E.T.S. 5 (1968); see 
also BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 55 (describing the UK’s terrorism policy prior to 
the 2000 codification as a “hodgepodge of different laws, and different police and 
intelligence organizations”). 
115 See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 55 (noting through example the 
length of time devoted to the definition included in the Terrorism Act of 2000). 
116 Terrorism is defined as (1) the use or threat of action where the use or 
threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental 
organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or 
threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause, and (2) it involves serious violence against a person, involves serious 
damage to property, endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person 
committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or 
a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to 
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At first glance, such restrictive language appears to narrow the 
definition of terrorism from that of the 1989 legislation.  However, 
additional catch-all language at the end of the definition, including 
the characterization of terrorism as any use or threat of serious 
violence against a person, serious damage to property, serious risk 
to the health and safety of the public, or disruption of an electronic 
system, so long as a firearm or explosive is involved and regardless 
of motivation of the actor,117 broadens the scope of the legislation 
enormously by removing the requirement of a politically 
motivated intent.  The text of the definition suggests that any 
violent act committed against another person where a firearm is 
involved may be considered terrorism by the government and 
treated as such.  
Given its open-ended construction, the definition of terrorism 
has come under considerable criticism from academics and the 
British parliamentarians for its potential for abuse of individuals 
affiliated with politically unpopular causes who oppose the 
government.118  Compounding the effect of the broad definition of 
 
disrupt an electronic system.  Terrorism Act, 2000, c.11, §1(1)–(2) (U.K.). 
 Finally, under subsection (3), any use or threat of action falling within 
subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism 
qualifies as terrorism, regardless of the purpose of the action is to influence the 
government or intimidate the public.  Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §1(2)–(3) (U.K.). 
117 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, Part I (U.K.) (describing situation where 
subsection two of the act need not be satisfied). 
118 See JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: TERRORISM BILL AND RELATED MATTERS, THIRD REPORT, 2005–06, 
H.L. 75–I, H.C. 561–I, para. 12 (U.K.).  The report states that:  
The main problem to which [the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism 
Act 2000] gives rise, is that the counter-terrorism measures are capable of 
application to speech or actions concerning resistance to an oppressive 
regime overseas . . . .  The Home Secretary does not deny that this is the 
effect of the offence but defends its scope on the basis that there is 
nowhere in the world today where violence can be justified as a means of 
bringing about political change.  
Id.  See also ANDREW BLICK, TUFYAL CHOUDHURY AND STUART WEIR, THE RULES OF 
THE GAME: TERRORISM, COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 44 (2005) (arguing that the 
2000 Act’s broad definition leaves room for the persecution of legitimate political 
activities).  The authors note further that the vagueness and breadth of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 definition of terrorism could be incompatible with Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of 
expression.  See also The European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 114, 
art. 10(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions . . . without interference by public authority and 
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terrorism is the fact that the Act expands the list of substantive 
crimes related to terrorism to include material support119 and 
incitement,120 and shifts the burden onto defendants to disprove 
their affiliation with terrorist organizations.121  Further, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2000 also allows for the stop and 
search of any individuals whom police “reasonably suspect” of 
being involved in terrorism.122  This provision has led to the 
disproportionate targeting of South Asian men by police, often 
leading to periods of pre-arrest detention, and then release when 
the police decided not to charge the suspects with a crime.123  In 
fact, the police have stated that the value of the stop and search 
power was not to gather intelligence or to capture individuals who 
have plotted or executed attacks, but as a tool to disrupt and deter 
potential terrorist activity, further noting that the stop and search 
powers were sometimes applied “in a pretty random way.”124 
Since subsequent antiterrorism legislation continued the trend, 
established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000, of increasing 
police powers and curtailing civil liberties, the effects of the broad 
definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act and the potential abuse of 
human rights continue to be significant. 
These effects were exacerbated by the perception after 
September 11, 2001 that a fundamental change had occurred in the 
 
regardless of frontiers.”).  
119 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 15–16, 18 (U.K.). 
120 Id. §§ 59–61.  
121 Id. § 41(1).  This burden-shifting provision was diluted to some extent by 
the House of Lords in Sheldrake v. DPP, [2003] EWCA Crim 762, [2004] UKHL 43, 
[2005] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [264] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
122 Terrorism Act, 2000, c.11, §43 (U.K.). 
123 See U.K. HOME OFFICE, STATISTICS ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 21–34 (2006), available at http://www.statewatch.org 
/news/2006/mar/s95race05.pdf (describing disparities in stop and search rates 
between groups); see also BLICK, supra note 118, at 49–50 (noting the percentage of 
British Muslims surveyed who describe being stopped and searched).   
124 See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, TERRORISM AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, 
SIXTH REPORT, 2004–05, H.C. 165–I para. 54 (U.K.) (referring to the Memorandum 
submitted by the Association of Chief Police Officers).  Of the 702 arrests made 
under the Terrorism Act 2000 that occurred in the three years immediately 
following September 11, 2001, fifty percent (351 of 702 arrests) resulted in the 
release of the arrestee without charge.  Id. para. 55.  Notably, of the convictions 
under the Act, similar percentages of convicts were affiliated with Islamist causes 
as the Irish Republican Army.  Id. para 56. 
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nature of threats to national security.125  Although there is much 
disagreement as to whether the new policies and laws are effective 
in combating short-term and long-term national security threats,126 
the British government, police forces, and critics of the legislation 
agree that the effects of the new security measures fall 
disproportionately on the British Muslim population.127  In fact, the 
public support for the more stringent legislation appears to be 
predicated, in part, by the understanding that the effects of the 
legislation will be felt most by a small minority of the British 
population128—a reaction that appears to mirror the indifference to 
curtailed liberties for the Catholic population of Northern Ireland 
during the Troubles. 
This racialized application of antiterrorism laws has led to a 
counterproductive result:  resentment among the British Muslim 
population and sympathy among Muslim communities for 
extremist groups.129  The same phenomenon occurred during the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland, in which legislation that appeared to 
be facially neutral was applied disproportionately to the Catholic 
population there.  In the context of that conflict, disparate 
treatment led to a backlash against the British government and 
encouraged moderate Catholics to sympathize with and protect 
even violent separatists.130 
 
125 See BLICK, supra note 118, at 9 (describing how terrorism and counter-
terrorism measures affect the relationship of trust between the public and 
government). 
126 See, e.g., BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 65–66 (analyzing arguments regarding 
the efficacy of the robust counterterrorism measures authorized under the 2000 
Terrorism Act). 
127 See BLICK, supra note 118, at 9 (describing potential effects terrorism and 
counter-terrorism measures on the Muslim community); Setty, supra note 3, at 
149–50 (noting the counterterrorism techniques used in Northern Ireland during 
the Troubles of the 1970s and 1980s). 
128 See BLICK supra note 118, at 12 (noting that members of the general public 
did not feel that the 2000 Terrorism Act, or other antiterrorism legislation, would 
impinge on their rights because it was their understanding that the most intrusive 
aspects of the legislation “will not be used against ‘us,’ they will be used against 
‘them’”). 
129 See id. at 15 (describing the growing sympathy for “religious and political 
extremism” among Britain’s Muslim communities). 
130 See id. at 33–34 (noting that that the government never realized the 
“potentially damaging effects” of counter-terrorism measures); see also Setty, supra 
note 3, at 156–57 (describing how military sources saw a subsequent increase in 
political violence following the internment program in Northern Ireland). 
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3.2.2. Subsequent Anti-Terrorism Legislation  
In the years following the September 11 attacks, Parliament 
passed a number of statutes meant to increase the number of 
substantive offenses associated with terrorism, the counter-
terrorism powers of the government, and the penalties associated 
with a terrorism conviction.  All of these measures were still 
predicated on the expansive and unevenly applied definition of 
terrorism that was laid out in the 2000 Act. 
The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATSCA)131 
was passed in an unusually fast timeframe in the months after the 
September 11 attacks132 and eliminated several of the procedural 
and civil liberty safeguards that Parliament took care to include in 
the 2000 Act.  For example, whereas the 2000 Act—given the 
expansive reach of its definition of terrorism—took care to disallow 
criminal prosecution as terrorists of bystanders who choose not to 
speak during an investigation, that provision was reinstated in 
ATSCA.133  ATSCA also authorized the indefinite detention and 
removal of aliens who, without a trial or process, were merely 
suspected of being terrorists.134  Although this provision was 
judicially rejected in 2004, it demonstrates the severe ramifications 
of being labeled—without trial or further process—a terrorist.135   
 
131 See generally Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001, c.24 (U.K.) 
(hereinafter ATSCA) (amending the 2000 Terrorism Act through the addition of 
further provisions against terrorism including the freezing of assets and the 
extension of criminal laws and powers for law enforcement). 
132 In November 2011, the House of Commons Select Committee on Home 
Affairs reported its discomfort at the speedy passage of such consequential 
legislation.  See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY 
ACT OF 2001, FIRST REPORT, 2001, at paras. 11, 68.  “A Bill . . . with major 
implications for civil liberties should not be passed by the House in such a short 
period and with so little time for detailed examination in committee.”  Id. at para. 
68. 
133 See ATSCA, supra note 131, § 117 (stating that a “person commits an 
offence if he does not disclose the information as soon as reasonably practicable”).  
See also BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 69 (discussing the reinstatement of the 
bystander cooperation rule). 
134 See ATSCA, supra note 131, at § 23 (“A suspected international terrorist 
may be detained . . . despite the fact that his removal or departure from the United 
Kingdom is prevented”).  Reports suggest that fourteen individuals had been 
subject to indefinite detention, some for longer than two years, under this 
provision.  BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 72. 
135 The detention and removal provisions of ATSCA were rejected in A v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which the Law Lords held that the 
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The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,136 although subject to 
robust and heated debate,137 continued Parliament’s trend toward 
increasing police power, expanding substantive offenses related to 
terrorism and allowing for the undermining of fundamental civil 
liberties in the name of national security.  One of the most 
controversial provisions in the 2005 legislation was the creation of 
a broad framework for control orders, which authorize the 
detention of or significantly curtail the freedom of movement of 
those suspected—but not convicted of—terrorism-related activity, 
or tendencies toward terrorism-related activity.138  The definition of 
terrorism that underpins the use of control orders is the extremely 
broad provision created in the Terrorism Act 2000.139 
 
detention and removal powers were inconsistent with Section 4 of the Human 
Rights Act, 1998, c.42 (U.K) and the U.K. obligations under Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  See generally A v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.).  Lord Hoffman, 
writing on the equal protection issue, noted that: 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what 
terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the 
terrorists such a victory.   
Id. para. 97. 
136 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (U.K.). 
137 See BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 72–73 (detailing the divisions and debates 
within the governing Labor Party and in the House of Lords regarding the 
passage of the 2005 legislation). 
138 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, supra note 136, §§ 1–9 (describing 
the framework for authorizing control orders); see also id. § 1(3) (authorizing the 
Secretary of State or a court to issue a control order when it is deemed “necessary 
for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that 
individual in terrorism-related activity”).  This extremely vague standard severely 
implicates fundamental rights of privacy, dignity and association, and has come 
under harsh scrutiny from critics.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LETTER TO THE 
UK PARLIAMENT ON CONTROL ORDERS (Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/01/letter-uk-parliament-control-orders 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (detailing objections to the renewal of control order 
provisions from the 2005 Act). 
139 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.) (defining “terrorism” as the “use 
or threat of action” (1) “designed to influence the government or an international 
governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public”; 
(2) “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological 
cause”; and (3) which (a) “involves serious violence against a person”; (b) 
“involves serious damage to property”; (c) “endangers a person’s life”; (d) 
“creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public”; or (e) “is designed 
seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”).  The 
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After the July 2005 attack on the London transit system,140 
pressure mounted on the British government to pass another 
round of counterterrorism legislation.141  Again, predicated on the 
broad definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act, the Terrorism Act of 
2006 sought to extend the range of substantive terrorism offenses 
by criminalizing actions such as the “glorification” of terrorist 
activity, if such glorification is done with an intent or reckless 
disregard as to whether other people will be encouraged to commit 
terrorism offenses,142 and distributing a “terrorist publication” to 
others.143  Such criminalization authorized the government to 
prosecute imams and other Muslim leaders who, according to the 
government, fomented the July 2005 transit attackers’ extremism.144  
The 2006 Act also authorizes pre-charge detention of up to 28 
days145 if an individual is arrested on suspicion of being a 
terrorist.146 
 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 relies on 
international treaties and conventions, such as those described in section 2, to 
provide some parameters for the definition of terrorism.  See Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism art. 1(1), June 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 
196, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/196.htm 
(defining a “terrorist offence” as “any of the offences within the scope of and as 
defined in one of the treaties listed in the Appendix”). 
140 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note at 102 (recounting the events of the 
London bombings and noting that, as a result of the four terrorist explosions, 
fifty-six people were killed and more than 700 injured). 
141 See BECKMAN, supra note 60, at 76 (noting that then-Prime Minister Tony 
Blair responded to calls for stricter measures following the London bombings by 
laying out a twelve-point counterterrorism plan and subsequently introducing 
new legislation in Parliament). 
142 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, §§ 1, 3 (U.K.) (clarifying statements that qualify 
as direct or indirect statements of encouragement to commit, prepare, or instigate 
acts of terrorism or Convention offenses). 
143 Id. § 2. 
144 BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 78.  See also Alan Cowell, Blair Vows New Laws 
to End Sanctuary for Muslim Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/05/international/europe/05cnd-britain.html 
(detailing the August 5, 2005 speech by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair in which 
he vowed to remove “extremist” Muslim leaders). 
145 This shift to twenty-eight days was extremely controversial as it deviates 
from other criminal and counterterrorism standards.  For example, the Terrorism 
Act, 2000, allowed pre-charge detention to be a maximum of seven days.  
Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41, sch. 8 (U.K.).  Fourteen-day pre-charge detention 
is allowed under the Criminal Justice Act, 2003.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 
306 (U.K.).  Although debate had occurred on increasing the authorized duration 
of pre-charge detention to ninety days.  See Alexander Horne & Gavin Berman, 
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Such measures prompted introspection within the British 
government as well as international scrutiny of U.K. legal 
standards surrounding terrorism.  Critics questioned whether such 
lengthy pre-charge detention periods comport with the European 
Convention on Human Rights standards for due process.147  The 
British government has argued that the United Kingdom is in 
compliance with the Convention.  The government, however, was 
forced to confront the question of whether such draconian 
consequences of being suspected of terrorism, when triggered by 
the broad definition of terrorism from the 2000 Act, go too far in 
curtailing civil liberties and ordinary rule of law protections in the 
name of national security.148  The Tory-Liberal Democrats coalition 
government that took power in 2010 has made it clear that it plans 
 
Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorism Cases, SN/HA/5634 House of Commons Library, 
Home Affairs Section and Social and General Statistics Section 1, 1 (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05634.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Pre-
Charge Detention Report] (noting that the twenty-eight-day period had initially 
been introduced as a compromise from the Government’s original ninety-day 
period). 
146 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7) (U.K.) (detailing the extension of the 
detention period for suspected terrorists).  In June 2009, Parliament conducted its 
annual review of the 2006 Act to determine whether the twenty-eight-day pre-
charge detention period ought to be renewed (or allowed under the terms of the 
2006 Act to revert to a fourteen-day limit).  At that time, since the enactment of the 
2006 Act, approximately eleven suspects had been held by the police in pre-charge 
detention for twenty-seven to twenty-eight days.  Of those, eight were eventually 
charged with a crime and three were released.  See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (FIFTEENTH REPORT): 
ANNUAL RENEWAL OF 28 DAYS, 2008-9, H.L. 119, H.C. 726, ¶¶ 14, 20 (U.K.), available 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/119 
/119.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Annual Renewal Report] (providing an overview of the 
government’s statistical support for the extended detention program). 
147 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, arts. 5(2), 5(4), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (guaranteeing due process and 
a meaningful right to habeas corpus); see also 2010 Pre-Charge Detention Report, 
supra note 145, at 5–7 (emphasizing that the twenty-eight day pre-charge 
detention period was ultimately decreased to fourteen days in January 2011 due 
to the highly controversial nature of the extended period). 
148 See 2009 Annual Renewal Report, supra note 146, ¶ 29 (“[W]e remain of the 
view that the renewal of the maximum extended period of 28 days risks leading in 
practice to breaches of Article 5(4) ECHR.”); see also BLICK, supra note 118, at 48 
(noting that critics suggest that this type of pre-arrest detention may violate the 
United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
unless the United Kingdom chooses to formally derogate from Article 5 of the 
Convention based on a national emergency). 
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to roll back the authorized pre-charge detention period as well as 
numerous other counterterrorism measures.149 
The government has also expressed some concern about the 
potential reputational damage of harsh counterterrorism 
legislation and the poor example it sets for other nations struggling 
to maintain the rule of law while implementing robust security 
measures.  The authors of one parliamentary report commented 
that, “[i]t is distressing to see how the slackening of procedural 
safeguards in countries like France, the UK and the USA, has been 
exploited by other States with less well-entrenched legal systems 
and human rights safeguards.”150 
U.K. legislation from the 2000 Act onward illustrates two 
phenomena.  First, a broad definition of terrorism is now 
entrenched.  When the 2000 Act was introduced to Parliament, a 
robust debate on the protection of human rights, civil liberties, and 
the rule of law commenced.  Parliament implemented a broad 
definition, repurposed and expanded from previous parameters set 
up specifically to deal with the troubles in Northern Ireland, 
without subsequent revision through the passage of numerous 
other counterterrorism laws.  Second, each of the post-2000 
counterterrorism laws included increasingly punitive measures—
including authorizing the use of control orders, broad immigration 
deportation powers and extensive pre-charge detention—
predicated on the same broad definition found in the 2000 Act. 
With a system of broad counterterrorism measures that 
compromise rights and liberties in significant ways, the British 
government is confronted with the question of how and to what 
extent structural measures are necessary to safeguard against 
government overreaching and abuse. 
 
149 See HOME DEPARTMENT, REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY 
POWERS: REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 2011, Cm. 8004, at 4–6 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm80 
/8004/8004.pdf (recommending the overhaul of various counterterrorism 
measures, including curtailing the period of pre-charge detention, the use of 
control orders, and the scope of authorization for stopping and searching 
suspects). 
150 2009 Annual Renewal Report, supra note 146, ¶ 31 (quoting 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION: 
REPORT OF THE EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 157 (2009), available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf). 
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3.2.3.  Safeguards Against Abuse 
Given the expansive scope and sometimes subjective and 
problematic application of the statutory definition of terrorism, the 
British Parliament has created several systemic safeguards that 
provide some procedural protection.  A one-year renewal 
provision is embedded in many statutes, including those that deal 
with the definitional parameters of terrorism.151  Further, the 
legislation mandates an annual review of all counterterrorism 
measures by outside reviewers and parliamentary committees 
prior to renewal of the legislation.152   
When dealing with statutes such as the ATSCA, which was 
passed quickly and increased police powers considerably, 
Parliament combined sunset measures with robust review 
processes by independent reviewers to provide a substantial check 
on potential abuse by the government.153  The more substantial 
review required under ATSCA did not extend to the authorization 
for issuance of control orders, which must be renewed each year154 
but are not subject to the level of external review required under 
ATSCA, pursuant to the 2005 Act.  
In addition to including sunset measures and the mandate for 
parliamentary review, the British government has taken an 
additional step by appointing an independent examiner to review 
numerous aspects of British counterterrorism law and policy, 
including the definition of terrorism itself.155 
 
151 See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 13(1) (U.K.) (“[This Act] 
expire[s] at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which 
this Act is passed.”). 
152 See, e.g., BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 67 (indicating that the U.K. Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2000 includes a provision “that mandates that the laws be 
reviewed and analyzed each year (i.e., annually) and that a report on the review 
be submitted back to the Parliament for reconsideration”). 
153 See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 132, ¶ 40 (requiring an annual 
review of detention powers by Parliament that is “based on an annual report by 
an independent commissioner”); id. ¶ 43 (requiring the expiration of certain 
immigration and detention powers such that it cannot be renewed quickly by 
Parliament, but rather would have to be re-enacted as primary legislation by the 
full Parliament after five years). 
154 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 13(9) (U.K.) (“Nothing in this 
Act about the period for which a control order is to have effect or is renewed 
enables such an order to continue in force after the provision under which it was 
made or last renewed has expired or been repealed by virtue of this section.”). 
155 This is a particularly important safeguard, as counterterrorism measures 
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In 2005, the U.K. government asked Lord Carlile to examine the 
statutory definitions of terrorism to determine whether their scope 
and application comported with Parliamentary intent, and to 
analyze the definitions’ implications on civil liberties.156  Carlile’s 
analysis is expansive, taking into account the history of terrorism’s 
definitions in U.K. legislation.157  Carlile began his assessment by 
critiquing the definition used in the 1989 legislation dealing with 
violence in Northern Ireland:  “[T]he use of violence for political 
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting 
the public or any section of the public in fear[.]”158   
Carlile faulted this definition159 for lacking differentiation 
based on the seriousness of the violence and for its exclusion of 
acts motivated by non-political purposes (e.g. religious ends).160  
He noted that the nature of a terrorist act, in its scope, intent, and 
method, is substantially different from an “ordinary” crime.  
Therefore, terrorism necessitates extraordinary measures by 
intelligence and law enforcement officers.161  Carlile also appears to 
 
have become more robust and the consequences of being labeled a terrorist more 
severe.  See, e.g., CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 1–2 (noting that Lord Carlile has 
served as an independent reviewer of British counterterrorism legislation and 
policy since 2001, and that, in this capacity, he has made several recommendations 
to Parliament on the effect of various counterterrorism measures). 
156 See id. ¶ 1 (detailing the Parliament’s request to Lord Carlile to write a 
report concerning the “definition of terrorism”).  
157 See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, 
Preamble (noting that the legislation was, in part, to replace legislation dealing 
with emergency measures for Northern Ireland); id. at pt. VI (detailing legislative 
measure specifically for Northern Ireland). 
158 Id. § 20(1). 
159 Other definitions have been faulted as well.  For example, in 1996, Lord 
Lloyd of Berwick, a previous independent reviewer, had recommended that the 
United Kingdom adopt the operational definition used by the U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation at the time: “The use of serious violence against persons or 
property, or threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
public or any section of the public, in order to promote political, social or 
ideological objectives.”  CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 9 (opining that the FBI’s 
definition was too narrow, excluding situations such as the “disruption of air 
traffic control or other vital electronic systems”). 
160 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 8 (“That definition had major drawbacks . . . .  
[I]t was restricted in terms of intention/design, in that it excluded violence for a 
religious end, or for a non-political ideological end.”).  
161 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 29–31, 39–40 (arguing that although robust 
counterterrorism legislation and policies naturally reduce the rights and 
protections of individual defendants, the measures are appropriate given the 
circumstances, and can be likened to other contexts in which special legal 
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equate modern terrorism in the United Kingdom with Islamic 
jihadism, particularly noting the jihadist goal of “condemn[ing] 
Western society and its value systems,” replacing those systems 
with Islamic law, and changing the foreign policies of nations.162 
Given the expansive scope of the definition of terrorism and its 
perceived orientation toward Islamic jihadism, Carlile considers 
recommendations for certain exceptions to the definition of 
terrorism to improve protection for defendants’ rights.  He 
analyzes arguments regarding the exclusion of “offences against 
property,” “offences for a religious purpose” because of the 
difficulty in defining religion precisely, offenses “lacking a 
sufficient political or ideological component/motive,” “mere 
preaching or glorification” of terrorist activity, and freedom 
fighting against an oppressive regime.163  He also considers 
whether state actors should be considered within the framework of 
counterterrorism legislation.164 
These concerns and tensions almost exactly parallel the debates 
that continue to plague efforts to reach an international consensus 
on the definition of terrorism.  Yet, ultimately, Lord Carlile rejects 
all of them,165 despite noting problematic labeling, such as the 
 
measures are already taken, such as “drug dealing and serious fraud”). 
162 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 32–34 (considering whether other types of 
criminal behavior, including that of Theodore Kaczynski (a.k.a. the “Unabomber”) 
and “extreme animal rights activists,” ought to fall under the legal framework of 
“terrorism”).  Carlile concludes, ultimately, that such individuals are not 
“terrorists” for the purposes of intelligence and law enforcement, and are 
appropriately treated as ordinary criminals, primarily because ordinary law 
enforcement measures can effectively deal with such actors, whereas those same 
measures would be inadequate to deal with terrorists such as Islamic jihadists.  
Id.; cf. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of 
Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2009) (arguing that the “racialized 
social construction” of an uncommonly dangerous Arab or Muslim terrorist was 
created by counterterrorism policies in the post 9/11 context).  Racial or religious 
profiling based on the perception of the extraordinary threat of Islamic terrorism 
has pervaded some U.S. counterterrorism efforts, much to the detriment of 
establishing trust with the discontented communities being affected.  See, e.g., 
Eileen Sullivan, AP IMPACT:  NYPD Spied on City’s Muslim Partners, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/ap-
impact-nypd-spied-citys-muslim-partners-14674817. 
163 CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 48. 
164 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 83–84 (discussing that although no one 
should be above the law, the issue is one of jurisdiction and not definition). 
165 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 50–54 (rejecting objections that the label of 
terrorism is inappropriately applied to offenses against property, offenses 
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inclusion of Nelson Mandela on a government-issued list of 
terrorists.166  Not only does Carlile recommend maintaining the 
status quo with regard to the definition of terrorism, but he further 
argues that terrorism-related convictions ought to carry harsher 
penalties.167  Carlile also suggests that any abuse of expansive 
police and prosecutorial powers related to terrorism can be 
resolved without modifying its threshold definition.168  The 
government agreed with almost all of Carlile’s conclusions169 and 
 
committed in the name of religion, and offenses that do not contain a significant 
political or ideological component); id. ¶ 72 (upholding the inclusion of 
glorification of terrorist activity as “terrorism,” although voicing some concern 
based on the application of this type of criminalization stretching back to Henry 
II’s execution of Priest Becket in 1164); id. ¶¶ 77–78 (rejecting the exclusion of 
freedom fighters from the label of “terrorism” based on the European Union 
mandate that member states adopt a “zero-tolerance” approach to terrorism); id. 
¶¶ 84–85 (rejecting the inclusion of state actors in the definition of terrorism based 
on complications with foreign relations and diplomatic immunity). 
166 Nelson Mandela was removed from the Terrorist Watch List in 2008 as a 
result of presidential decree.  Mandela Taken Off US Terror List, BBC NEWS, July 1, 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7484517.stm.  Menachem Begin was also listed 
as a terrorist for his actions against the British regime in the early 1940s.  See 
Theodore P. Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1227, 1227–29 
(2002) (listing all of Menachem Begin’s transgressions). 
167 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 86(8) (recommending new and additional 
sentencing powers for criminal activity that is “aggravated by the intention to 
facilitate or assist a terrorist”). 
168 Carlile takes on one of the most difficult questions posed by the use of a 
broad and sweeping definition of terrorism: are law enforcement officers 
appropriately exercising their discretion when deciding to try a defendant as a 
terrorist, with the concomitant rights reductions that are entailed in such a 
designation, as opposed to an ordinary criminal?  Carlile finds that the layers of 
review and code of ethics within the Crown Prosecutor’s office, along with the 
protections of a jury trial for defendants, offer sufficient protections against 
selective or biased prosecution.  See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 60–62 (stating the 
parties involved in prosecution as follows: the police, the Crown Prosecution 
Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney General, potentially the 
judiciary through judicial review, and the jury); see also id. ¶ 63 (explaining that 
any impropriety by the Attorney General, who oversees the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, can be controlled by Parliament). 
169 See HOME DEPARTMENT, THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: THE GOVERNMENT 
REPLY TO THE REPORT BY LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C. INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF 
TERRORISM LEGISLATION, 2007, Cm. 7058, ¶¶ 1–10, 12–16 (U.K.) (accepting nearly 
all of Lord Carlile’s conclusions).  The only point of disagreement with Carlile’s 
recommendations was that the Government did not think it necessary to clarify 
the definition of terrorism to include an intent requirement of intimidation.  Id. ¶ 
11 (emphasis in original) (“We do not consider that the bar is set too low by the 
use of the word influence [as opposed to intimidate].”).  
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Parliament soon thereafter made changes to comport with most of 
Carlile’s recommendations.170   
Carlile’s analysis was extensive and included input from the 
military, law enforcement officers, intelligence agencies, Muslim 
community groups, human rights organizations, and others.  This 
undertaking, although not resulting in greater substantive rights 
protections, provides one level of procedural fairness in the sense 
that the shifting legislative definitions of terrorism are going 
neither unnoticed nor unchecked.  Carlile’s conclusions, 
particularly those that seem to focus counterterrorism efforts on 
Islamic jihadist groups, may only serve to alienate British Muslims 
and other outsider groups.171  Nonetheless, the institutional 
element of undertaking such an independent review is valuable 
because it demonstrates that Parliament is cognizant of the 
potentially harsh effects of being considered a “terrorist.”  It has 
responded to the potential abuses of the definition by reassessing 
such legislation in a meaningful and comprehensive way. 
3.3. India 
India’s struggle with issues concerning national security has 
been ongoing since its independence in 1947.172  India’s legal 
response to those struggles has been characterized by a heavy 
reliance on constitutionally and statutorily granted emergency 
powers.173  India also depends on robust non-emergency criminal 
 
170 E.g., Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 34 (U.K.) (amending the definition of the 
word “terrorism” by adding after the word government “or an international 
governmental organisation”).  
171 See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 26–27 (describing how the alienation of 
British Muslims in the post 9/11 era is partly a result of disparate treatment under 
counterterrorism laws and the perception of a distortion in the application of the 
rule of law). 
172 See Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and 
Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 99 (2006) (describing violence 
related to terrorism as a “chronic crisis of national security”); see generally K.R. 
GUPTA, ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS: INDIA, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM 
AND ISRAEL (2002) (chronicling the history and development of “anti-terrorism 
legislation” in India).  
173 See INDIA CONST. arts. 352–56, amended by The Constitution (Ninety-fourth 
Amendment) Act, 2006 (stating the emergency powers provisions); see also 
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE 
INDIAN EXPERIENCE 295–97 (2003) (discussing the era of Emergency Rule under 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi). 
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laws that authorize broad police powers and significantly curtail 
defendant’s rights in a manner strikingly similar to that of 
emergency powers.174 
3.3.1.  History of Security Legislation 
The robust police and intelligence-gathering powers granted to 
the Indian government in various statutes arise from a long history 
of the granting of such powers.  The powers also come from a 
history of dealing with the terrorist/freedom-fighter duality.  
Being labeled a “terrorist” can often have an augmenting effect to a 
criminal cause, as such individuals are lauded as heroes and role 
models in some disaffected communities within India.175 
Security policies, regulations, and laws have been part of the 
governance of India since the East India Company176 established 
rules for dealing with separatists and seditionists in 1793.177  
 
174 See Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 116–17 (arguing that Article 22 of the 
Indian Constitution provides that those arrested “must be provided the basis for 
arrest ‘as soon as may be’ and produced before a magistrate within 24 hours”).  
However, Article 22(3) of the Constitution allows the central and state 
governments to enact preventive detention laws during non-emergency times and 
contains a carve-out such that a person arrested or detained under preventive 
detention laws need not be brought before a “magistrate within 24 hours of being 
taken into custody[,]” nor does the detainee have the right to counsel or to be 
informed of grounds for arrest.  Id. at 135 (citing INDIA CONST. art. 22(3), amended 
by The Constitution (Ninety-fourth Amendment) Act, 2006). 
175 See Madan Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 3 S.C.R. 692, 705 (India) (noting 
that “by wearing the cloak of terrorism, [criminals] aim to achieve acceptability 
and respectability in the society”); see also Schmid, supra note 12, at 389, 414 
(discussing the distinction between terming violent attacks as freedom-fighting 
versus terrorism). 
176 The East India Company, under Royal Charter from the British 
Government, had administrative and military control over parts of India from the 
middle of the eighteenth century until 1858.  Administrative control over India 
was officially transferred from the East India Company to the British government 
through the Government of India Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106 (Eng.) following 
the First War of Independence in India, also referred to as the Sepoy Mutiny of 
1857.  Many of the regulations used by the Company during their rule in the 
previous 100 years were simply adopted by Parliament and their enforcement was 
unchanged by the shift in political, administrative, and military control.  See 
generally SUGATA BOSE & AYESHA JALAL, MODERN SOUTH ASIA: HISTORY, CULTURE, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (2d ed. 2004); AUSTIN, supra note 173.   
177 CM Abraham, India—An Overview, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND 
SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 59, 60 (Andrew Harding & John Hatchard, 
eds., 1993) (discussing preventive-detention and security measures taken as early 
as 1784 by representatives of the East India Company). 
2011] HOW NATIONS DEFINE TERRORISM 47 
Regulations allowed for preventive detention—even without 
grounds for trial—for state security reasons.  This same preventive 
detention system has been modified over the years and continues 
to be used by the Indian government in modern times.178 
During colonial rule, numerous ordinances and regulations 
allowed for extraordinary measures to be taken in the name of 
national or governmental security, even in times of non-
emergency.179  In 1950, the Indian Constitution enshrined the 
government’s ability to utilize emergency powers,180 which 
continued to be used widely in the post-independence era, when 
the government relied on emergency powers to deal with external 
threats from China and Pakistan.181 
Non-emergency and emergency powers were used to combat 
internal security threats during the 1970s and early 1980s.  Yet even 
the non-emergency criminal provisions included expansive police 
powers, such as the power to preventively detain suspects for 
prolonged periods182 and freeze assets of those organizations 
deemed to be “unlawful.”183 
 
178 See Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 127–28 (noting in recent years, under 
TADA and POTA, the government has maintained preventive detention centers). 
179 E.g., Indian Councils Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 67; Government of India 
Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 101; Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5, c. 2 
(authorizing the appointed Governor-General to issue ordinances if necessary to 
preserve national security in the face of external or internal threats). 
180 See INDIA CONST. arts. 352–56, amended by The Constitution (Ninety-fourth 
Amendment) Act, 2006 (delineating emergency powers provisions). 
181 See M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 679–80 (5th ed. reprint 2008) 
(2003) (describing the invocation of Article 352 in the context of military conflicts 
with China and Pakistan). 
182 See, e.g., The National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980, 
§§ 1, 13 (India) (describing the Act’s objective as “to provide for preventive 
detention in certain cases and for matters connected therewith,” and allows for 
preventive detention for up to 12 months in certain cases). 
183 See, e.g., The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of 
Parliament, 1967, § 7 (India) (describing the terms under which “funds of an 
unlawful association” can be prohibited).  Far-reaching legislation, such as the 
UAPA and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1970), set a framework for 
harsh treatment and penalties for criminal acts related to external and internal 
security, but did not attempt to define terrorism for the purpose of criminalizing 
the substantive acts in question. 
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3.3.2.  Defining Terrorism 
In the period after Emergency Rule ended in India, political 
and economic instability, exacerbated by security threats, kept the 
Indian polity in a state of extreme upheaval.184  In the 1980s the 
Punjabi separatist movement fueled government fears that 
violence would spread and separatist movements throughout 
India would gain strength.185  The fears motivated the Parliament 
to pass the Terrorist Affected Areas Act of 1984 (TAAA), which 
granted more structured and comprehensive police and 
intelligence-gathering powers.186  This statute contains the first 
legislative definition of a “terrorist,” which requires that a person 
kills, acts violently, disrupts essential services, or damages 
property; with the purpose of intimidating the public, coercing the 
government, endangering the sovereignty or integrity of India, or 
“affecting adversely the harmony between different religious, 
racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities.”187 
This extraordinarily broad language is mitigated by two 
factors:  first, like the U.K. legislation governing conflicts in 
Northern Ireland, the legislation is limited to particular areas of 
conflict designated by the government.188  Second, the substance of 
TAAA focuses on the establishment and use of special, expedited 
courts for trying suspected terrorists in designated “affected 
areas.”189  Although using special courts for suspected terrorists 
raises important due process and rule of law issues,190 TAAA’s 
 
184 See AUSTIN, supra note 173, at 295–97 (detailing the reaction to 
authoritarian rule during the Emergency). 
185 The government’s fear of Sikh separatists gaining strength fueled the ill-
conceived Operation Bluestar attack on Sikhs in Amritsar in 1984.  
186 See Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, No. 61, Acts of 
Parliament, 1984 (India) [hereinafter TAAA] (“An act to provide for the speedy 
trial of certain offences in terrorist affected areas and for matters connected 
therewith.”).  
187 See id. § 2(1)(h) (noting that this definition of a terrorist could, if applied 
indiscriminately or subjectively, cover many legitimate activities related to 
business or free expression). 
188 See id. § 3 (designating “affected areas”). 
189 See id. §§ 4–16 (establishing rules, procedures, and jurisdiction of the 
special courts). 
190 See Setty, supra note 3, at 164–70 (discussing the historical use of 
specialized courts in India and the accompanying curtailment of suspected 
terrorists’ procedural rights). 
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limited geographic and procedural scope curtailed, to some extent, 
concerns about civil rights and constitutional infringement.191 
However, as is evident in other domestic counterterrorism 
contexts, the definition of terrorism was quickly repurposed and its 
application was broadened vastly.  In the wake of the assassination 
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) was passed in 1985.192  This 
new act defined terrorism in largely the same terms as TAAA.193 
The geographic and situational limitations that limited the civil 
liberties implications of TAAA, however, were lifted, such that the 
definition of terrorism and the concomitant police powers it 
granted were expanded to all of India.194  TADA also resurrected 
robust police powers and measures drawn out of the emergency 
 
191 See Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 145 (noting that substantive offenses 
are only categorized as acts of terrorism if they occur in certain regions, under the 
TAAA). 
192 See The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, No. 31, 
Acts of Parliament, 1985 (India) [hereinafter TADA] (“An act to make special 
provisions for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive 
activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”). 
193 Part II of the TADA adds detail to the manner of attack or threat contained 
within TAAA’s definition of terrorism:  
Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established 
or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate 
any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst 
different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, 
dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or 
firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other 
chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of 
a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, 
death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or damage to, or 
destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services 
essential to the life of the community, commits a terrorist act. 
See id. § (3)(1).  
194 Although TADA was initially enacted with a carve-out for Jammu and 
Kashmir, it was quickly amended to apply to all regions of India.  See Kartar Singh 
v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, 635 (India) (holding that the 1985 TADA, 
among other acts, “fall[s] within the legislative competence of Parliament in view 
of Article 248”); see also The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 
1987, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 1987, Part I, §1(2) (India) [hereinafter TADA 1987 
Amendments] (amending TADA to expand the statute’s jurisdiction to cover all of 
India, Indian citizens throughout the world, employees of the Indian government, 
and passengers on “ships and aircraft registered in India”); Kalhan et al., supra 
note 172, at 100 (noting that the 1987 version of TADA was renewed repeatedly 
until it was allowed to expire in 1995). 
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period and earlier, such as allowing coerced confessions by police 
officers to be used against defendants in the special courts,195 and 
increasing the penalties for those convicted of terrorist or 
disruptive acts.196      
The constitutionality of TADA, including that of its vague and 
broad definition of terrorism,197 was upheld by the Indian courts 
with some reservations about the limitation of rights and potential 
abuse of power.198  In validating the scope and jurisdiction of the 
definition of terrorism, without close examination of its impact or 
the original intent of the legislation, the courts cemented the right 
of the government to use such definitions, even after TADA 
expired in 1995.199 
 
195 See TADA 1987 Amendments, supra note 194, pt. III, § 15 (considering 
specific kinds of confessions made to police officers). 
196 See TADA 1987 Amendments, supra note 194, pt. II, § 6 (describing 
enhanced penal provisions). 
197 The TADA definition of terrorism is broad, vague, and subject to much 
criticism.  See e.g., Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 225 (recommending that the 
Indian government “narrow the definitions of substantive terrorism-related 
offenses under UAPA to eliminate vagueness”).  However, the Act was not found 
to be a defeating measure for those convicted pursuant to the statute.  See Madan 
Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 3 S.C.R. 692 (India) (observing that it is not possible 
to provide a precise definition of terrorism). 
198 See Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 375 (India) (upholding 
the constitutionality of TADA, but in recognition of its potential problems, 
establishing guidelines to be followed by police offers in recording a confession).  
Along the same lines as the critique of the material support statute in the United 
States, the Indian Supreme Court has expressed some concern about the 
vagueness of the intent requirement when showing that a defendant has aided 
and abetted a terrorist act.  Notwithstanding such concern, the Indian Supreme 
Court has upheld the relevant provisions of TADA and POTA.  Id.; see also V. 
Vijayakumar, Legal and Institutional Responses to Terrorism in India, in GLOBAL ANTI-
TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 351, 353 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005) (indicating 
that although the Supreme Court observed the application of TADA to political 
opponents and petty criminals, for example, it upheld the constitutionality of the 
legislation “in spite of the sweeping powers given to the authorities”). 
199 Various groups objected to the long-lasting effect of TADA on the 
counterterrorism landscape in India.  For example, the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC), established in 1994 by The Protection of Human Rights Act, 
1993, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 1994 (India), objected to the renewals of TADA 
and, in the 1990s, argued that “any worthwhile strategy to combat insurgency and 
terrorism requires strong citizen support[,]” which can be achieved by dialogue 
with the respective societies affected by the acts of terrorism.  NAT’L HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1996–1997).  The NHRC further noted that 
that the registration of over 250 allegations of abuse and misuse by security forces, 
and India’s obligations to adhere to international human rights standards, should 
give pause to the police powers granted under any future counterterrorism 
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TADA’s definition of terrorism was reused and broadened 
with the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 
(POTA),200 passed partially in response to the Resolution 1373 
global mandate to fight terrorism.201  Although POTA was repealed 
as part of a political pledge to deal with human rights abuses by 
police and intelligence forces,202 many of the substantive provisions 
regarding the treatment of terrorism suspects were incorporated 
into amendments to the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 
(UAPA),203 thereby edging counterterrorism legislation closer to 
colonial and Emergency-era provisions that provided a framework 
for criminalizing seditious and disruptive activities.204  The Indian 
Supreme Court continued its deferential stance toward such 
legislation, validating the broad exercise of police powers because 
of the compelling state interest in counterterrorism without 
 
legislation.  Id. at 10–12. 
200 See The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 
2002 (India) Chapter II, § 3(1)(a), for a definition of perpetrator of a terrorist act as 
one who: 
[W]ith intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of 
India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does 
any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or explosive substances or 
inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons 
or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances . . . of a 
hazardous nature or by any other means whatsoever, in such a manner 
as to cause . . . death of, or injuries to any persons or loss of, or damage to 
. . . property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life 
of the community . . . . 
Id.  
201 See V. Venkatesan, The POTA Passage, FRONTLINE, vol. 19, issue 8, Apr. 13, 
2002, at 13 (noting that various cabinet ministers had encouraged the passage of 
POTA in parliamentary debates based on the mandate of Resolution 1373, and 
that even opposition groups eventually voted to pass POTA as a result of these 
pressures). 
202 Repeal of “Anti-democratic” Laws Sought, THE HINDU, Aug. 7, 2004, 
http://www.hindu.com/2004/08/07/stories/2004080707001100.htm (describing 
the misuse of POTA, TADA, and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 
especially in Manipur and Bihar's Jehanabad district). 
203 The 2004 UAPA amendments included incorporating a definition of 
terrorism, which was not a part of the original 1967 legislation.  The 2004 
definition largely paralleled the POTA definition.  See The Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, 2004, No. 2, § 15, Acts of Parliament, 2004 
(India) (defining “terrorist act”). 
204 See generally Kalhan, supra note 172 (focusing on the underlying continuity 
between colonial-era provisions and modern police powers and counterterrorism 
laws). 
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examining the definition of terrorism on which those powers were 
predicated.205 
The most recent set of counterterrorism laws were enacted after 
a three-day terrorist attack in Mumbai in late November 2008, in 
which 163 people were killed.206  Outrage among the Indian public 
led to demands for stronger national security and antiterrorism 
measures.207  In response, Parliament rapidly passed the National 
Investigation Agency Act (NIA Act)208 and further amendments to 
the UAPA.209  These Acts broadened police powers210 and curtailed 
civil liberties at trials in the newly reinstated special courts211 in 
ways that are identical to POTA provisions that Parliament had 
rejected in its legislative repeal four years earlier.212 
However, the effect of the new legislation is actually broader 
and more prone to abuse because of the definition of terrorism on 
which the new police and intelligence powers are predicated.  The 
 
205 See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 6 (Supp.) S.C.R. 
860, 880 (2004) (India) (upholding the constitutionality of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, 2002, and noting that, on policy grounds, it was not permitted to 
“go into and examine the ‘need’” for the act).  The Court further observed that the 
Government “has an obligation to exercise all available options to prevent 
terrorism within the bounds of the Constitution,” and that the “mere possibility of 
abuse cannot be counted as a ground for denying the vesting of powers or for 
declaring a statute unconstitutional.”  Id. 
206 See Somini Sengupta, In Mumbai Transcripts, an Attack Directed from Afar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A5 (describing intercepted communication detailing 
the preparations of the attacks). 
207 See Somini Sengupta & Keith Bradsher, India Faces a Reckoning as Terror 
Toll Eclipses 170, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at A1 (questioning whether Indian 
authorities could have better anticipated the terrorist attack and ensured 
heightened security). 
208 See National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, No. 34, Acts of Parliament, 
2008 (India) (creating an “investigation agency at the national level” to handle 
security issues). 
209 See Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, No. 35, Acts 
of Parliament, 2008 (India) [hereinafter UAPA 2008 Amendments]. 
210 See Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, No. 35, § 
43D(2)(a-b), Acts of Parliament, 2008 (India) (authorizing prolonged preventive 
detention); see also id. § 43D(5–7) (limiting access to bail for pre-trial detainees). 
211 These changes to trial procedures included shifting the burden of proof to 
the defendant in some cases, id. § 16(1), using summary trials, id. § 16(2), and 
allowing the court to proceed without the defendant in attendance.  Id. § 16(5).  In 
a regular criminal proceeding, the accused is protected by The Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, Act No. 2 of 1974, § 273 (India), which requires evidence to be 
taken by a court only when the accused is present. 
212 See National Investigation Agency Act, supra note 208, ch. IV. 
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2008 UAPA amendments broaden the definition of a terrorist act 
from the previous definition used in POTA, so that acts “likely to 
cause” the type of damage contemplated in the POTA-era 
legislation are now also considered to be “terrorist acts.”213 
Although such measures may seem extraordinary, the history 
of Indian legislation against perceived security threats serves as a 
reminder that many individual elements of current 
counterterrorism legislation can trace their roots directly back to 
the colonial era.  The burden-shifting provision in the 2008 UAPA 
amendments, for example, was not only part of POTA, but can be 
found a century earlier in 1908 legislation dealing with explosive 
substances.214  However, as the government introduced these 
measures into Parliament in 2008, it did not hearken back to the 
 
213 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, supra note 
203, § 15.  The specific definition is as follows: 
Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or 
sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the 
people in India or in any foreign country, does any act by using 
[weapons as described in the POTA definition], in such a manner as to 
cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or 
loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or [other damage to 
infrastructure and defense], or detains any person and threatens to kill or 
injure such person in order to compel the Government in India or the 
Government of a foreign country or any other person to do or abstain 
from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.   
Id. (emphasis added); see also Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, HUMAN RIGHTS 
DOCUMENTATION CENTER (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc 
/hrfeatures/HRF191.htm (noting that this definition institutionalizes the worst 
overreaching and missteps from TADA and POTA because it relates not only to 
counterterrorism policy, but to other “disruptive” activities). 
214 The Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Act No. 6 of 1908 (India).  Under this 
Act, if a person knowingly possesses or controls an explosive substance and the 
police have a “reasonable suspicion” that the possession is for unlawful purposes, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove lawfulness.  If he is unable to do so 
and is, therefore, convicted, punishment is penal transportation for up to 14 years, 
plus the possibility of a fine being imposed.  Id. § 5.  The Explosive Substances Act 
also provides for punishing material support to the same degree as the offense 
itself.  Id. § 6.  Likewise, the authority for warrantless wiretapping found in the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, supra note 209, finds its roots 
in colonial legislation from 1885.  See The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, Act No. 13 
of 1885, § 5 (India) (noting that telegraph messages may be intercepted and kept 
by the central or state governments in times of “public emergency, or in the 
interest of the public safety” if it is deemed necessary or expedient to do so “in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, 
friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement 
to the commission of an offence”). 
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colonial and Emergency-era history of India; instead, it claimed 
that these measures were a necessary step in India’s obligations to 
fight terrorism under international mandates such as Resolution 
1373.215 
As the law currently stands, India has used the leverage of the 
mandate under Resolution 1373 to implement or reinstate 
counterterrorism measures that are problematic on a number of 
fronts.  First, the definition of terrorism on which the measures are 
based is extremely broad and subjective, making the potential for 
government abuse high.216  Second, many of the substantive 
provisions in the UAPA 2008 Amendments had been previously 
rejected based on concerns over human rights abuses, including 
the targeting of Muslim populations and other groups without 
political power.217  Third, although TADA and POTA both 
 
215 See Statement of Objects and Reasons of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Amendment Bill, supra note 209.  Here, the government noted the concerns over 
human rights abuses under previous counterterrorism legislation, but stated that: 
[K]eeping in view that India has been a front-runner in the global fight 
against terrorism, its commitments in terms of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution, 1373 dated 28th September, 2001 and the 
resolve not to allow any compromise in the fight against terrorism, the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was amended to make 
provisions to deal with terrorism and terrorist activities. 
Id. (statement of P. Chidambaram). 
216 See Kalhan, supra note 172, at 181–98 (detailing various problems in the 
application of counterterrorism laws by the police and intelligence forces, 
including violations of political speech and associational rights, malicious 
prosecution of non-terrorism related crimes under terrorism statutes against 
disfavored social groups, police misconduct, and threats against defense and 
human rights lawyers). 
217 Critics of TADA and POTA often noted that Muslims were prosecuted 
severely under these statutes, whereas Hindus accused of the same acts were 
often not prosecuted or charged with ordinary criminal offenses that carried 
lighter sentences upon conviction.  See Amos Guiora, Legislative and Policy 
Responses to Terrorism, A Global Perspective, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 125, 171 (2005) 
(noting that some described POTA as a “terrorist law [that would be] . . . used to 
terrorise minorities”); see also Sudha Ramachandran, Filling India’s Anti-terrorism 
Void, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 23, 2004, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FI23Df03.html (noting that while 
the majority of the 32 organizations banned under POTA were Muslim, none of 
the Hindu extremist groups were ever targeted); Sachin Mehta, Repeal of POTA 
Justified, LEGAL SERVICES INDIA, http://www.legalservicesindia.com 
/articles/pota.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (observing that POTA had been 
“abused to book, without lucidity and accountability, political opponents and 
underprivileged communities”). 
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contained sunset provisions meant to provide at least some 
legislative check on the powers exercised by police and intelligence 
forces, the 2008 UAPA amendments do not contain similar 
protections.  Finally, the 2008 UAPA amendments do not require 
any meaningful judicial scrutiny of the prosecutor’s decision—and 
the central government’s review authority—as to whether 
detainees will be categorized as ordinary criminals or treated as 
terrorism suspects who are then afforded many fewer rights.218 
4. DEFINITIONS WITHIN A COMPARATIVE AND  
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
The arc of post-September 11 counterterrorism policy at the 
United Nations is one in which the initial drive to mandate robust 
counterterrorism measures affected domestic policies deeply, and 
it was tempered only years later with reminders to member states 
of their human rights obligations under international law.  This lag 
in emphasizing the rights aspect of counterterrorism efforts was 
costly in terms of creating the political space for domestic laws that 
are vague, subjective, and allow for potential abuses.  
Part of the post-September 11 shift in domestic definitions of 
terrorism is attributable to domestic political forces and the 
legitimate need to reassess the efficacy of counterterrorism law and 
policy in light of the attacks that had occurred.  However, domestic 
forces offer only part of the explanation for the changes.  The broad 
mandate of Resolution 1373 and the lack of a comprehensive 
General Assembly definition of terrorism created pressure for 
domestic action and leverage for political actors to push through 
controversial legislation in the name of international compliance,219 
 
218 See Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, supra note 213. 
219 For example, in India, proponents of strong antiterrorism legislation used 
the mandate from Resolution 1373 to push through the 2001 Prevention of 
Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) and the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act.  Notably, 
POTO had been in the works, through the Indian Law Commission and other 
channels, since 2000.  See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, 173RD REPORT ON PREVENTION OF 
TERRORISM BILL, ANNEXURE II § 30, 33 (2000) (containing provisions similar to 
those found in POTA regarding the extension of preventive detention and 
arrested suspects’ access to legal counsel); see also Sudha Setty, No More Secret 
Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists 
Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 615–16 (2009) (discussing the history of POTA, and 
explaining that the Indian Law Commission’s report was “an early iteration of 
some of the POTA policies”).  There had been significant opposition to the 
adoption of POTO based on human rights concerns related to similar powers 
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regardless of whether such legislation fostered potential abuses of 
discretion and the poor treatment of socially disfavored groups.220  
After the benefit of several years of experience with member 
states’ actions in the “war on terror,” the United Nations 
established rights-oriented structural mechanisms,221 made clear 
that counterterrorism measures had to take into account the 
human rights of individual nations,222 and, more recently, created a 
 
granted under TADA.  Politicians and government officials cited the need to 
comply with Resolution 1373 as an incentive for the passage of this legislation 
over the objections of human rights groups.  See Press Release, Government of 
India, Press Brief on Chief Minister’s Conference on Internal Security (Nov. 17, 
2001) (describing the Home Minister’s response to critics of POTO, observing that 
“UN Resolution 1373 mandated follow up legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the Resolution and some provisions of this law were in part 
implementation of the UN Resolution”).  As such, the passage of POTO represents 
an instance of a state “us[ing] terrorist incidents to pursue agendas that reach far 
beyond the immediate threat.”  DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 15.  On the 
transnational front, India and the United States used Resolution 1373 as a 
springboard for mutual cooperation in increasing intelligence-sharing and in 
providing additional technological resource to Indian intelligence officials.  See 
Press Release, Embassy of India, Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Joint Working 
Group on Counterterrorism (July 12, 2002) (detailing the cooperative efforts 
between the United States and India, including the following directives: exchange 
of information, strengthened intelligence, a mutual assistance treaty, and other 
initiatives on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373).  
220 For example, the Indian National Human Rights Commission’s (NHRC) 
objections—that The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2000 would lead to 
gross human rights abuses and contravene India’s obligations under international 
human rights standards—were overwhelmed by the political pressure to enact 
new legislation after Resolution 1373 was passed.  See Vijayakumar, supra note 
198, at 356–57 (noting that the NHRC rejected the need for new counterterrorism 
legislation in 2000 in light of existing criminal laws that were sufficient to cover all 
of the relevant substantive acts could be prosecuted). 
221 See S.C. Res. 1535, ¶ 1-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004) 
(establishing the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, a 
committee with a proactive obligation to ensure that human rights concerns were 
being met by member states attempting to comply with the mandate of Resolution 
1373); see also Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, COUNTER-
TERRORISM COMM., http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html (last updated June 
20, 2011) (clarifying that, although human rights law is outside the scope of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee’s (CTC) mandate, the CTC remains aware of 
human rights concerns, and explaining that both the CTC and the CTC Executive 
Directorate should incorporate human rights into their communications strategies 
as part of their mission to support compliance with Resolution 1373). 
222 See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 2, ¶ 6 (making clear that nations are 
obligated to ensure that “any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all 
their obligations under international law . . . in particular international human 
rights, refugee, and humanitarian law”).  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1624 
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working group to consider ways in which member states can be 
effectively encouraged to harmonize their coexisting 
counterterrorism and human rights obligations.223 
The United Nations’ shifting emphasis toward human rights 
reflects several priorities:  the deontological imperative to protect 
individuals from overreaching and abusive governments; the need 
to remind nations of their international obligations under the 
Geneva Conventions and the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights;224 and a pragmatic view of counterterrorism, 
since governmental abuse of human rights and the targeting of 
disaffected minority groups results in mistrust of the government 
and alienation in those groups most likely to be sympathetic to the 
cause of terrorists.225 
Yet the nations examined here have not all followed the 
trajectory of the United Nations toward focusing on strengthening 
security measures and rights protection simultaneously.  Each of 
these nations has broadened its definitions of terrorism and the 
scope of the application of those definitions.226  In the United 
 
likewise emphasizes the need to respect human rights in counterterrorism 
operations.  See S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 34, ¶ 5 (expressing deep concern about 
the importance of upholding human rights obligations when implementing 
counterterrorism measures). 
223 See S.C. Res. 1805, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1805 (Mar. 20, 2008) (affirming 
the CTC’s endorsement of the “Organizational plan for the Counter-Terrorism 
Executive Directorate”); see also Rosand, supra note 52, at 340 (creating a working 
group to focus on human rights issues in the context of domestic counterterrorism 
efforts). 
224 All of the nations examined in this Article are signatories to both 
conventions. 
225 See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All, ¶¶ 140–47, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) 
(detailing the importance of human rights in combating terrorism).  Then 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan opined: 
It would be a mistake to treat human rights as though there were a trade-
off to be made between human rights and such goals as security or 
development.  We only weaken our hand in fighting the horrors of 
extreme poverty or terrorism if, in our efforts to do so, we deny the very 
human rights that these scourges take away from citizens. Strategies 
based on the protection of human rights are vital for both our moral 
standing and the practical effectiveness of our actions. 
Id. ¶ 140. 
226 See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 15 (describing how counterterrorist 
measures create an institutional interest such that government agencies once 
entrusted with expansive powers are always reluctant to give up those powers). 
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States, several legal developments paint a picture of a continuing 
trend away from rights protection.  First, the Patriot Act definition 
of terrorism broadens its scope and application.  Second, the 2006 
vote that made the amendments permanent and removed the 
sunset provisions in the legislation essentially cemented a broad 
and arguably vague definition of terrorism.  Third, recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence makes clear that the Court will defer to 
executive and legislative conceptions of terrorism, however 
vague,227 and concomitantly limit the availability of remedies to 
individual plaintiffs when potential abuses of power are alleged.228 
Similarly, definitional creep has occurred in India.  The original 
justifications for broad definitions—such as the limited application 
of the definition to a particular situation for a limited period of 
time in a case of genuine Emergency—no longer exist in the law.  
Instead, Indian legislation has seen ever-broadening definitions of 
terrorism with the removal of sunset provisions and procedural 
safeguards.  Although the Indian government claims that misuse 
will not be tolerated,229 abuse has been rampant under vague 
parameters in laws like TADA and POTA, and the subjectivity of 
prosecutorial and investigative decision-making in the application 
of the statutes makes them ripe for overreaching and misuse.230  
The discourse regarding the justifications for broadly written 
legislation has become less resonant, as such measures are seen as 
necessary to comply with international mandates, and are 
normalized within society as national security crises continue to 
occur. 
 
227 See Said, supra note 97, at 580–82 (explaining the expansion of the 
definition for terrorist organization).  
228 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (holding that generalized 
pleadings regarding alleged governmental abuses motivated by religious animus 
were insufficient to meet the notice pleading standard articulated in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and as described in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
229 See, e.g., Human Rights Violations Will Not Be Tolerated in Jammu and 
Kashmir: Manmohan, THE HINDU, June 7, 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article448962.ece (quoting Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as stating, “the government policy is to protect 
the human rights of the people even when dealing with terrorism . . . .  We will act 
to remove any deficiency in the implementation of [this policy]”). 
230 Setty, supra note 3, at 167–70 (detailing human rights concerns related to 
the application and enforcement of TADA, POTA, and the 2008 UAPA 
amendments). 
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Like the United States and India, British counterterrorism law 
has undergone a serious transformation in the last two decades, 
particularly since the September 11 attacks in the United States and 
the July 2005 attacks in London.  The definition of terrorism has 
been broadened and repurposed from the limited context of 
Emergency provisions for Northern Ireland to the Terrorism Act of 
2000, which applied generally and was further expanded by later 
legislation.  This pattern paralleled the United States’ shift in 
definition from the limited FISA context to the broad Patriot Act 
context, and the Indian shift from the limited application of TAAA 
to the broad applicability of police and intelligence powers in 
TADA and all subsequent counterterrorism legislation. 
However, compared with the United States and India, the 
United Kingdom has maintained at least some check on potential 
abuses of power associated with a broad definition of terrorism by 
continuing the mandatory renewal provisions for counterterrorism 
legislation, utilizing—and taking seriously—the recommendations 
of an independent reviewer, and enjoying a more robust system of 
parliamentary and judicial review for counterterrorism 
legislation.231 
Additionally, as of 2010, the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government has made clear that it will try to curtail various 
antiterrorism measures that were prone to abuse,232 giving rise to 
 
231 Scholars have argued that the many layers of institutional review utilized 
in the United Kingdom are not evident in the U.S. system because of a historical 
reliance on separation of powers, but note that such reliance may be misplaced in 
times of unified government.  See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 18–19 (explaining 
the absence of independent oversight mechanisms in the United States); Daryl J. 
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2311, 2314–15 (2006) (detailing how the rise of political parties changed the 
dynamics of separation of powers, and explaining that executive power 
aggregates when the President and both houses of Congress are controlled by the 
same political party). 
232 See REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS: REVIEW 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at 3 (recommending the repeal 
or narrowing of various counterterrorism measures in order to “correct the 
imbalance that has developed between the State’s security powers and civil 
liberties, restoring those liberties wherever possible and focusing those powers 
where necessary”); CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL DEMOCRAT COALITION AGREEMENT 
2010, ¶ 10, available at http://www.conservatives.com/~/media 
/Files/Downloadable%20Files/agreement.ashx?dl=true (noting that the 
Agreement states that, among other goals, the coalition government will work 
toward curtailing invasive and overreaching laws, and instituting “[s]afeguards 
against the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation”); see also Queen Elizabeth II, Her 
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the possibility that coalition-building between the political left—
interested in protecting civil liberties and reducing the 
marginalization of outsider communities233—and the political 
right—interested in cutting back on costly government programs 
and lessening government involvement in the lives of private 
citizens234—can lead to synergies in curtailing potential misuse and 
abuse of national security powers.235 
The United Kingdom has also set an example in the inclusion 
sunset clauses in all antiterrorism legislation, even those that have 
seemingly less controversial provisions such as definitions,236 and 
requiring that the legislative committee must first review all of the 
 
Majesty's most gracious speech to both Houses of Parliament on 25 May 2010 
(May 25, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/queens-speech-2010-2/) (emphasizing the 
need to repeal legislation that has compromised civil liberties). 
233 See LIBERAL DEMOCRAT MANIFESTO 2010, at 94–95, (detailing a 2010 
campaign platform by the Liberal Democrats noted that “the best way to combat 
terrorism is to prosecute terrorists, not give away hard-won British freedoms”).  
The manifesto promised four reforms in Britain’s security framework: (1) to 
“[r]each out to the communities most at risk of radicalisation to improve the 
relationships between them and the police and increase the flow of intelligence”; 
(2) to eliminate “control orders, which can use secret evidence to place people 
under house arrest”; (3) to “[r]educe the maximum period of pre-charge detention 
to 14 days”; and (4) to “[m]ake it easier to prosecute and convict terrorists by 
allowing intercept evidence in court and by making greater use of post-charge 
questioning.”  Id. 
234 See INVITATION TO JOIN OUR GOVERNMENT: THE CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 
2010, at 79.  This 2010 campaign platform by the Conservatives argued that the 
Labor government had “trampled on liberties and, in their place, compiled huge 
databases to track the activities of millions of perfectly innocent people, giving 
public bodies extraordinary powers to intervene in the way we live our lives.”  Id.  
Instead, the Conservatives suggested that new legislation be introduced to stop 
“state encroachment,” “protect people from unwarranted intrusion by the state,” 
and save money by cutting back on unnecessary security initiatives.  Id. 
235 See Henry Porter, A Tory-Lib Dem Coalition Offers Hope for Civil Liberties, 
THE GUARDIAN, May 10, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/henryporter/2010/may/10/conser
vative-liberal-democrat-coalition-civil-liberties (noting that civil liberties was one 
of a few areas in which Conservative and Liberal Democrat priorities were 
aligned); see also David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 606, 
617 (theorizing that national security policy may be better reasoned in nations 
where political minorities take an active role in governance). 
236 See John Ip, Sunset Clauses and Counterterrorism Legislation 3 (May 26, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1853945& (detailing the 
history of U.K. sunset clauses in counterterrorism legislation). 
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provisions of a statute, including definitions, and subsequently 
renew the antiterrorism legislation.237 
The appointment of an independent reviewer of 
counterterrorism legislation offers further procedural protections 
against abuse.  Such a measure does not necessarily translate into 
the curtailing of counterterrorism legislation—in fact, Lord Carlile 
recommended that most elements of the legislative definition of 
terrorism remain intact.  However, the review process itself 
provides some safeguard by assuring external, expert, apolitical 
review of basic questions of national security and human rights.  
Such review is not foreign to the United States—the review process 
for designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the 
AEDPA exists to ensure accuracy and provide a procedural 
safeguard against misuse.  Adoption of a requirement for the 
review of all counterterrorism legislation, including the 
fundamental question of how terrorism is defined, would parallel 
protections that we already recognize as necessary in some 
counterterrorism contexts. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The definitional creep occurring in these jurisdictions reflects 
the problematic re-contextualization that seems almost endemic as 
governments attempting to delineate the parameters of executive 
power in national security matters.  But because the definition of 
terrorism is a threshold question that has widespread and 
sometimes severe ramifications, we must be aware of the shifting 
application of the definition and its historical roots.  Only with 
such an analysis can we consider whether the definition continues 
to be appropriate in the larger calculus of national security, human 
rights, legal protections for defendants, and rule of law 
considerations. 
Perhaps this definitional question, which in each nation seems 
to have broadened and expanded its definition of terrorism238—not 
 
237 BLICK, supra note 118, at 59–60 (recommending a review process that 
encourages, at a minimum, a “public focus for debate”).  But see DONOHUE, supra 
note 80, at 339–40 (arguing that sunset provisions rarely provide a substantial 
check on potential abuse, and suggesting that more robust reporting requirements 
would be more useful). 
238 Notably, these nations have not broadened the definitions of terrorism to 
include state actors, a move in which a nation would potentially implicate itself 
and its allies.  See Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International 
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just the police powers or sentencing guidelines that go along with 
it, but the definition itself—with each major national security crisis, 
also sheds some light onto why there continues to be so much 
controversy at the international level as to the definition of 
terrorism. 
The stakes are extremely high and the application of the 
definition seems to evolve without much consideration in the 
legislative process as to the appropriateness of each application.  
Instead, political pressures lead to the development of broad 
definitions of terrorism as one means of constructing a strong 
counterterrorism program.  Political pressure is a powerful 
shaping mechanism on legislators and the executive, and can lead 
to less self-policing and a decreased emphasis on safeguarding 
civil rights and liberties in the process of defining terrorism and 
applying the definition to individuals.  As with many legislative or 
executive decisions regarding national security and a high level of 
politicization and emotional investment, the brunt of government 
overreaching falls on politically unpopular and/or disenfranchised 
minorities. 
Courts have provided little check with regard to vagueness or 
the scope of the application of the definition of terrorism, instead 
of relying on a long-standing deference to the political branches in 
matters of national security.239 
As such, any rights protection based on concern of 
overreaching and/or disparate impact on outsider communities 
must come from legislative self-policing, such as that which has 
occurred in the United Kingdom.  Such self-policing, if it comes in 
the form of a legislative appointment of an independent reviewing 
 
Community’s Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 491, 
494–95 (2004) (arguing for inclusion of state-sponsored acts—such as the support 
given to Osama bin Laden by the Taliban, or the support given by the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. to various revolutionary movements during the Cold War—in the 
definition of terrorism). 
239 Such judicial deference for foreign policy and war-making matters has a 
long history in the United States.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944) (deferring to executive power in wartime and finding the internment of 
all Japanese during wartime constitutional); United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (finding that the legislative branch may grant 
executive discretion in matters of foreign affairs); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863) 
(finding that the executive branch had the power to impose a naval blockade 
against secessionist states without prior approval from the legislative branch). 
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body,240 would insulate politicians from the potential politically 
damaging effects of such a review, and would provide a structural 
core encouraging of impartiality and a deep level of review. 
Of the nations compared here, the United Kingdom has made 
the most promising assessment of the problems concomitant with a 
broad domestic definition of terrorism, an international mandate to 
pursue counterterrorism measures, and the human and civil rights 
abuses that may occur as a result.  In doing so, it has followed the 
trajectory of the post-September 11 reaction of the United Nations 
Security Council—moving from broad-based mandates to combat 
terrorism to a more nuanced and even-handed approach that 
values safeguards against human rights abuses. 
The United States and India could and should do the same—
going beyond current efforts to pursue both security and rights, 
and enacting laws that narrow the definition(s) of terrorism to suit 
current needs, or justify current, or broader, definitions through 
examination, consideration, and due weight given to the enormous 
rights implications that ensue once the definition of terrorism is 
found to apply. 
 
 
 
 
240 In India, the Indian Law Commission, a non-partisan group of lawyers 
and judges commissioned by the central government to offer advice and 
proposals for legal reform, could serve as an independent reviewing body for 
definitions of terrorism, as it has reviewed and proposed numerous pieces of 
counterterrorism legislation.  E.g., 173RD REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
BILL, supra note 219, § 30, 33. 
